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COUP D'ETAT IN THE UNITED STATES:
IMPOSSIBLE OR IMPROBABLE?

by

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COUP D'ETAT IN THE UNITED STATES: IMPOSSIBLE OR IMPROBABLE?

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requirement for the degree of

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from the

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ABSTRACT

This thesis looks comparatively at the social and intra-military conditions that have led to coups d'etat in other countries, in order to evaluate whether a coup d'etat could occur in the United States. This thesis also creates a fictional scenario for this possibility to demonstrate that this phenomenon is not isolated to developing and economically backward nations. The thesis argues not that a coup will actually occur in the United States, but that the U.S. system of civil-military relations has been neglected and may need reform to meet the needs of the United States as a superpower. Supporting research covers the history of U.S. civil-military relations, current problems in U.S. civil-military affairs, and theoretical causes of coups. It concludes that there currently is not a risk of a coup d'etat in the United States but that it may become possible in the future.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Despite the prevalence of the coup d'etat and the widely distributed types of government that are susceptible to this event, there is an almost dogmatic belief that the United States will never experience a military takeover. Even the recent fear of a "crisis" in U.S. civil-military relations is not familiar to the public, the vast majority of the military or the government. Theories on coups d'etat and civil-military relations encourage this sense of invulnerability in the United States. Some theorists state explicitly that the United States, with its form of democracy, is immune to the phenomenon.

The United States supposedly possesses the archetypical form of government and society to prevent coups. Significant changes in the structure and mission of the military leads some experts to believe that the current system of civil-military relations must be overhauled to meet current needs before it collapses. The most important issue that needs to be addressed is whether changes have made it possible for a coup d'etat to occur in the United States. What are the factors that would make an officer or group of officers in the U.S. military decide to take such a dangerous and irregular course of action?

Chapter I presents the relevance and background for the thesis. Chapter II will cover the development of both the U.S. model of civil-military relations and the concept of civilian control of the military. This discussion will indicate the changes that have occurred in our history

and how they affect present civil-military relations. Historical analysis will also provide the background for discussion of present problems in U.S. civil-military relations.

Current problems will be detailed and analyzed in Chapter III to determine if there are signs of a present or impending crisis which could create conditions that make a coup possible. Chapter IV will provide supporting research covering the theories on the occurrence of coups d'etat to define these conditions. It will lay out the reasons behind a military's decision to seize power. The final task, in Chapter V, will be to create a scenario based on the research findings.

The goal of this research and the creation of the fictional scenario is not to prove that the United States will experience a coup. It is designed to bring more attention to the subject of U.S. civil-military relations and the dangers of military intervention into politics. A historical review of U.S. civil-military relations shows that present military requirements do not conform with historical desires of the American public. A nation traditionally wary of large or standing militaries was forced into a world leadership role with extensive military needs. The original system of civil-military relations is strained by the new conditions. There are many who argue that there is a crisis in civil-military relations.

This thesis argues that there is not a crisis in U.S. civil-military relations if a crisis is defined as direct military challenge to civilian authority. Problems that exist result from the changing world

environment that forced the United States into its present role as a superpower. A professional military forced into political activism by the security needs of the nation and its own corporate interests has become separated from the political, civilian leadership. There will be continuing conflict between the military and the civilians over national policy and security issues as perceptions and goals diverge. With proper study and attention, these changes can be adjusted for in our civil-military relations without the loss of civilian control.

There are two issues that should be more carefully researched since they would be the most likely causes of a coup d'etat in the United States. The first issue is to determine factors that would cause the U.S. military to become further isolated from mainstream society in thought but more powerful in political and domestic influence. The second issue is to understand the conditions that could create a sense of danger within the U.S. military.

Further understanding of these two issues will allow the educated and effective revision of our system of civil-military relations. A more effective system will make the possibility of a coup d'etat, or any other form of military intervention, even less probable. Finally, a revised system of civil-military relations can lessen the conflicts between civilian and military leadership and thus increase effectiveness of defense and national security planning.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I. INTRODUCTION

There is a danger that can dismantle superpowers (Goble, 1996;Dobbs, 1991, pA01) and defeat the efforts of nations to attain economic and political health. It is not an attack from without but an enemy from within, the coup d'etat. The Soviet Union crumbled into the Russian Federation after a coup d'etat in August 1991 and suffered another one in 1993. As recently as October 1996, there were reports of plans for a coup in Russia. (McCurry, 1996) The last remnant of the Cold War could become a shooting war for the United States if North Korea succumbs to a coup d'etat that places the military in power. South Korea, an important U.S. ally is facing the results of a successful coup in 1980 and U.S. forces actively participated in the defense of the existing government in the Philippines in 1989. Danger of coups in Asia is heightened by succession issues in North Korea and the People's Republic of China, who many believe will be the next superpower.

The coup d'etat is also a prevalent incident worldwide. It happens often in Central and South America, Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia and has occurred in Northeast Asia, Europe, and Russia. The first four regions change governments through coups more often than through legal means. (O'Kane, 1987, p141; Zimmerman, 1979, p391) There are also more people, worldwide, who live under the rule of governments established through coups than through elections. (Luttwak, 1979, p9) Population trends in these countries make this

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applicable to the present. Coups d'etat are also not confined to undeveloped or third-world nations. France, a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, experienced a coup in 1958. Some other members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Greece and Turkey, experienced multiple coups in the 1960s,1970s, and up to 1980. (O'Kane, 1987, pp141-143; Luttwak, 1979, p32).

Despite the prevalence of the coup d'etat and the widely distributed types of government that are susceptible to this event, there is an almost dogmatic belief that the United States will never experience a military takeover. Except for interdisciplinary debates on issues affecting civil-military relations, there has been a historical lack of concern for this possibility. Even the recent fear of a "crisis" in U.S. civil-military relations (Snider and Carlton-Carew, 1995, p1) is not familiar to the public or the vast majority of the military or the government. Theories on coups d'etat and civil-military relations encourage this sense of invulnerability for the United States. Some theorists state explicitly that the United States, with its form of democracy, is immune to the phenomenon. The United States supposedly has the archetypical form of government and society to prevent coups (Finer (1962), 1988, p79, 131-132).

The form of the U.S. Government and the U.S. constitutional establishment of civilian control over the military are touted as the reasons that coups have not occurred in the United States. The Founding Fathers applied lessons learned from growing pains of

European nations when they created the Constitution, but their efforts were not directed at preventing a coup d'etat. (Cullop, 1984, p15) Civil-military relations have not been a problem for the United States as she has grown from a collection of rebellious colonies into a superpower due more to luck than planning. Despite greatly changed military needs and the accompanying tensions in civil-military relations, the armed forces of the United States have exhibited only isolated and limited defiance of their civilian leaders. Significant changes in the structure and mission of the military leads some experts to believe that the current system of civil-military relations must be overhauled to meet current needs before it collapses.

The most important issue that needs to be addressed is whether changes have made it possible for a coup d'etat to occur in the United States. The undertaking is illegal, irregular, and unpredictable. There are no chances to back down and failure carries very high penalties, including death. (Horowitz, 1980, p xi)

What are the factors that would make an officer or group of officers in the U.S. military decide to take such a dangerous and irregular course of action? Even if the needed conditions do not exist, efforts should be made to determine their possibility in order to prevent the conditions from developing. An even more important task to undertake, after the key factors are identified, is to create interest and debate on how to avoid these conditions from emerging within U.S. society and government.

The thesis will attempt to create a viable, fictional situation for a coup d'etat to occur in the United States. The scenario will be similar in format to the scenario create by Charles Dunlap in his article, *The Origins of the American Military Coup of 2012.* Background research is needed in three areas to support a credible event to serve as a polemic for further discussion.

Chapter II will cover the development of both the U.S. model of civil-military relations and the concept of civilian control of the military. This discussion will indicate the changes that have occurred throughout U.S. history and how they affect present civil-military relations. These changes will be the development of a professional military, the increased influence of the military establishment within government, and the growth of an adversarial relationship between the military and the civilian leadership. Historical analysis will also provide the background for discussion of present problems in U.S. civil-military relations.

Current problems will be detailed and analyzed in Chapter III to determine if there are signs of a present or impending crisis which could create conditions that make a coup possible. Chapter IV will provide supporting research covering the theories on the occurrence of coups d'etat to define these conditions. It will lay out the reasons behind a military's decision to seize power. The final task will be to create a scenario based on the research findings and conclusions. Chapter V will present this fictional story.

The goal of this research and the creation of the fictional scenario is not to prove that the United States will experience a coup. It is designed to bring more attention to the subject of U.S. civil-military relations and the dangers of military intervention into politics. An enhanced understanding of both civil-military relations and the coup phenomenon is the intended result of this thesis. Perhaps a wider understanding of both topics will make the United States more robust in efforts to prevent a coup from ever occurring here.

II. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES

A coup d'etat in the United States would signal a failure of its system of civil-military relations. An analysis of the history of civil-military relations within the United States will show what weaknesses exist or are developing in the system. Civilian control of the armed forces, the development of a professional military, and the changes in the U.S. world role have defined and have changed the relations between civilian leaders and the military. The method of civilian control of the military must also be reviewed. Samuel Huntington classifies the U.S. system as one relying on "subjective" vice "objective" control of the armed forces. (Huntington, 1985, p163) Both types of control will be presented to point out strengths and weaknesses in our system. Points of vulnerability inherent in this relationship can result in change or failure. Historical research will also set the stage for evaluation of the current tensions in civil-military relations, which will be discussed in Chapter III.

A.   CONCEPT OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

Civilian control of the military, as we are used to in the United States, is dependent upon the idea of a professional military. A professional, as defined by Samuel Huntington, is someone who practices a vocation that requires special expertise, responsibility, and corporateness. The professional is an expert in his field and has achieved this level of skill through prolonged education and practice.

Historical knowledge is important. Continuing research of the military arts and development of military skills are required also. As a practicing expert with a monopoly of knowledge in his field, the professional must serve society with a sense of responsibility that goes beyond simple profit. Unity and shared consciousness exist among the members of a profession. This collective sense leads to formalization and standardization of competence in the field. Military officers are most effective in the field when their conduct approaches this idea of professionalism and avoids distractions in politics.(Huntington, 1985, p9-11)

The U.S. military officer is a professional. Each officer possesses a near monopoly on the management of violence and is solely responsible for the conduct of warfare. Skill in management of violence is achieved through formal schooling and extensive experience. Society relies on the officer to use his skills for the common good and not for self-serving, particular ends. The military profession serves the state and its citizens by providing security. Commissions are required before an officer is given the right to practice his profession and entrance is limited and regulated. The military officer worldwide, however, has not always been a professional (Huntington, 1985, p19).

The birth of the professional military in the United States paralleled changes occurring in Europe in the nineteenth century. According to Huntington, prior to 1800, there was no professional officer corps anywhere in the world. Warfare was carried out by mercenaries and

aristocrats. Both types of officers served the needs of monarchs who needed to raise armies and then required standing armies. Officership was usually limited to those with wealth and influence. As a result, effectiveness and efficiency was limited until the birth of the military profession in the early 1800s (Huntington, 1985, p28).

The Prussian military of the nineteenth century is credited with creating military professionalism in western societies. The increasing complexity of warfare, the developing technology, and the diversified manning of the armed forces required a more professional officer. The growth of the nation state as the unit of political power also served to professionalize the military. Nation states require permanent experts to provide military security. (Huntington, 1985, p32) The rise of democratic thinking opened the officer corps to all citizens, ending the domination of the officer corps by powerful but men with marginally military effectivness. Finally, the nation also gave the military forces a single focus of authority. The military was to serve the nation as an institution and other cleavages or political considerations became less important. (Huntington, 1985, p36)

B.   CIVILIAN CONTROL OF THE MILITARY

1.   Why Civilian Control?

The professional military officer is the expert in the management of violence. He is not an expert on politics. Does this, however, imply that civilian leaders should have control over the armed forces? S.E. Finer says that

> ...there is a common assumption, an unreflected belief, that it is somehow 'natural' for the armed forces to obey civil power. But no reason is adduced for showing that civilian control of the armed forces is, in fact, 'natural'. Is it? Instead of asking why the military engage in politics, we ought surely to ask why they ever do otherwise. For at first sight the political advantages of the military *vis-a-vis* other and civilian groups are overwhelming. The military possesses vastly superior organization. And they possess *arms.* (Finer (1962), 1988, p4)

Clausewitz's theories on warfare provide the reason why the military should be subservient to the political leadership, but do not indicate how this is accomplished. According to Clausewitz, war is only justified when it serves a public purpose and is not an end in itself. War is subordinate to political ends and the extent and violence of war is bounded by these goals. He states that "...War is only a part of political intercourse, therefore by no means an independent thing in itself." (Clausewitz, 1832, p402)

The fact that war is a science assigns a role to the professional officer. Expertise is judged by the fighting ability of the armed forces and not by the nature of the cause for which they are fighting. The ends of the war are, therefore, outside the officer's responsibility and expertise. Since warfare should be subservient to the political goals of a nation, the soldier should be subservient to the statesman. (Huntington, 1985, p57) Clausewitz, therefore, provided a model of warfare which also justified civilian control over the armed forces.

The development of a professional military also created a set of ideas that were uniquely military. Achieving civilian control of the military requires that conflicts between these military beliefs and those of the society are controlled or minimized. The military ethic wishes to compensate for the shortcomings of human nature such as evil, irrationality, and weakness. It stresses the supremacy of the collective over the individual and the need for order, hierarchy, and obedience. War is an inescapable threat to the nation and power is the only effective means of providing security for the state. Military minds shun risk and overcommitment. Overall, it is

> ...pessimistic, collectivist, historically inclined, power-oriented, nationalistic, militaristic, pacifist,and instrumentalist in its view of the military profession. It is, in short, realistic and conservative. (Huntington, 1985, p79)

There are many ways that this military ethic could bring the military into conflict with its civilian leaders. Obedience to civilian orders could conflict with military expertise if officers see the orders as counterproductive or dangerous. Conflict could also arise if the orders are perceived to be counter to the common values of society or are deemed illegal.

2. Subjective Versus Objective Control

Huntington defines two methods by which civilian superiority over the military can be achieved. These means are subjective and objective civilian control. Subjective civilian control maximizes civilian power and objective control maximizes military professionalism. Both forms of

control rely on the power of civilian groups being greater than the power of military groups.

Subjective control maximizes the power of a given civilian group so that its power is greater than the military's power. The civilian groups are continually in conflict or competition with each other, so subjective control also enhances the power of one civilian group over other civilian groups. Therefore, the group that exercises civilian control differs from nation to nation. Subjective control is accomplished by "...maximizing particular government institutions, particular social classes, and particular constitutional forms."(Huntington, 1985, p81) It "...achieves its end by civilianizing the military, making them the mirror of the state (Huntington, 1985, p83)."

Governmental institutions that compete for power also compete for the right to exercise civilian control of the military. In the United States, the Legislative and Executive branches of government compete for influence and each argues that it is the proper executor of civilian control. Class struggles for influence can also use the issue of civilian control but they are not used for this purpose in the United States. A specific form of government or constitutional form can also be touted as the means of ensuring civilian control. Again, this is a competition between groups supporting different styles of government, with the winner gaining the right to exercise civilian control. A democratic form of government is believed to be the best for this purpose in the United States, but U.S. history has shown that this is not the only form of

government which can limit military power. Totalitarian states including Germany during the Second World War, are examples of non-democratic states where military political power was almost nonexistent. (Huntington, 1985, p82)

The professionalization of the armed forces complicated subjective control. The civilian groups were faced with an independent and unified group which is also competing for power and is no longer simply the tool of power struggles. The military's goals would have to be changed or denied for subjective control to remain possible because the concept of civilian control was no longer monopolized by a given civilian group. Huntington states that the subjective control is obsolete and that objective control is the only means of ensuring civilian authority. (Huntington, 1985, p83)

Objective control differs from subjective control because it relies on the distribution of power between military and civilian groups. Proper distribution will enhance professional behavior and attitude in the officer corps. It "...achieves its end by militarizing the military, making them the tool of the state." (Huntington, 1985, p83) Military power is minimized by "...professionalizing the military, by rendering them politically sterile and neutral." (Huntington, 1985, p84) The military officer stands ready to use his skills to defend the interests of his country, but leaves the definition of these interests to the political leaders. Huntington argues that objective control is superior to subjective control because there is not a conflict between the maximization of civilian control and maximization

of military security which exists in subjective control. A greater threat to national security would not cause an erosion of civilian control. Although objective control is preferable, the United States has not achieved this type of civilian control. The reliance on subjective control has its roots in American history.

C. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS BEFORE THE COLD WAR

1. Prior to the Civil War

Civilian control of the military has been important to the leaders of the United States since the founding of the country. (Libby, 1992) The Founding Fathers were wary of standing forces, however,they did not fear or predict the emergence of a professional military and the problems this would create for civil-military relations. The military was composed of citizen-soldiers whose ideas would be in agreement with those of the civilian leadership despite having commanded forces within the armed forces. (Johnson, 1995) Thomas Jefferson was more concerned with civilian groups using the military for their own ends than with the possibility that the military would seek power for itself. George Washington warned in his farewell speech for the United States to

> ...avoid the necessity of those overgrown military establishments, which, under any form of government, are inauspicious to liberty, and which are to be regarded as particularly hostile to Republican Liberty. (Washington, 1796)

The U.S. Constitution was written to provide civilian control of the military and for the maintenance of a balanced distribution of this

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power. The President serves as the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces while the Congress controls the funding for the military and the right to declare war. Congress is only authorized to appropriate funds for the Army for a period of two years. (Cullop, 1984, p104-108) This limitation was designed to ensure that there was public discourse and scrutiny of military policy and manning. (Libby, 1992) The United States, therefore, mobilized troops as needed and then demobilized troops after a conflict was concluded.

Distrust of and lack of need for standing armies prevented the development of a professional military prior to the Civil War. "...[T]he notion of a uniquely military perspective on policy and strategy had not been fully formed." (Johnson, 1995)

> From Major General Alexander Hamilton as Inspector General and principle architect of the Army during its first major expansion under the Constitution, during the Quasi War with France of 1798-1800--even from Lieutenant General George Washington as Commanding General during the Quasi War, the principal officers had moved back and forth between officership and politics. (Weigley, 1993, p36)

Even during the Civil War many generals from on both sides had credentials for command based on political position rather than on military leadership skills. (Johnson, 1995)

2. Changes Caused by the Civil War

The expansion of the U.S. Army into the approximation of a nation in arms, during the Civil War, created the corporateness needed for professionalism. The confidence, maturity, and autonomy gained through

this war gave the officers an identity apart from civilians. There also emerged a sense of social responsibility, an essential part of the definition of professional. (Weigley, 1993, p37)

Military officers after the Civil War were still in full support of civilian supremacy and sought to protect this belief by becoming politically isolated. Political participation was seen by the military as incompatible with military professionalism, therefore, it implemented a self-imposed isolation. (Johnson, 1995) The military establishment devoted its efforts toward the sole end of combat effectiveness and the science of combat. The academies instilled within the midshipmen and cadets a sense of contempt for politics and its dishonest practitioners (Huntington,1985, p259).

Lincoln's detailed involvement in the war did not cause the resentment that presidential control would engender during the Vietnam War. This was fortunate for civilian authority. Weigley argues that Lincoln's ideas about how the war should be fought coincided with those of his generals as the war progressed. McClellan believed in a manner of warfare which would not embitter the South and make reunification more difficult. By the time General Grant took over as General-in-Chief, Lincoln had decided that victory could only be achieved by the complete destruction of the Confederate military. Grant had embraced this style of warfare before he took command, as did his second-in-command, General Sherman. This fortunate agreement on strategic objectives foreshadowed

the tradition of civil-military affairs which would last for more than eighty years. (Weigley, 1993, p39)

3.   From the Civil War to the Second World War

Peaceful years and unchallenged security left the concept of miliary subordination untested. Military power was relatively unimportant to American interests so military involvement in strategy was not needed. (Johnson, 1995) The Spanish-American War of 1898 showed the acceptance of the status-quo in civil-military relations as President McKinley actively directed the war. Again, during the campaigns against Mexico in 1916-17, a President took minute control of the Army. President Wilson's changing political goals during the conflict led to its failure and to the possible destruction of General Pershing's career.

> Pershing nevertheless performed quietly and without compliant, doing as he was told and setting an example of tight lipped conformity to the orders of the civilian Commander-in-Chief under exceptionally exasperating conditions. (Weigley, 1993, p40)

According to Weigley, fortune again protected civilian supremacy as the United States entered the World War in 1917. President Wilson, who restrained military actions to serve narrowly defined goals in the Mexican conflict, now decided to commit the United States completely. Free reign was given to the military which was allowed to wage the war at its discretion. Since this autonomy, which greatly limited the President's role, was given to General Pershing and not seized, civil supremacy was, again, not tested. After the First World War, military respect for civilian authority continued to grow. This respect reached its zenith immediately

prior to the Second World War and, as argued by Weigley, was even viewed later as excessive (Weigley, 1993, p41).

Shadows of doubt were cast on the continuance of respect for civilian authority as plans were studied for the possible defense of the Philippines and actions against Japan. The armed forces saw the islands as indefensible, but the government had vowed to protect the Philippines. Both the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Chief of Naval Operations believed it was dangerous to fight Japan while Germany remained a threat. Despite the danger, neither man warned the President because they did not want to appear to challenge policy or participate in political decision making (Weigley, 1993, p42). The fear of impropriety led to a costly defeat in the Philippines after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor led to open war and demonstrated a failure of the civil-military system.

Relations between the civilian and military leaders changed after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor forced the United States into the war. The heads of the military branches were forced to make candid and numerous recommendation to the President and could no longer remain aloof from strategic decision making. Disagreements arose over the diversion of resources to the Nationalist Government in China and the decision to delay an invasion of Europe in order to attack the Magreb. Both operation diverted men and supplies from operations deemed more crucial by the military.

Wartime mobilization efforts also threatened to undermine cooperation between civilian and military leaders, Weigley states.

Business leaders were allowed to direct the economic and industrial mobilization and they chose to conduct business as usual. The situation that developed was similar to the economic mobilization of the First World War. The world's largest economy, again, was unable to provide a superior supply of war material to the armed forces. U.S. forces were not equipped with superior arms or sufficient amounts of ammunition despite the wealth of the nation. (Weigley, 1993, p50)

There were also shortfalls in manpower. Increasing manpower was required to maintain the economy during the mobilization and the armed forces were asked to scale down their manning to support this need. American Army divisions were, therefore, so few in number that it was impossible to rotate them out of the war. American ground forces, thus, were spread dangerously thin and combat effectiveness fell as fatigue mounted and divisional manning suffered from casualties. (Weigley, 1993, p52)

Due to either

> ...remarkably silent military acquiescence in numerous
> civilian decisions that threatened the effectiveness of
> strategy and operations,...(Weigley, 1993, p43)

or because of the willing abandonment of strategic decision by the civilian leaders (Huntington, 1985, p317), military and civilian leaders continued to cooperate. There were many reasons for the military to challenge civilian leadership since the military and especially the Army was forced to fight a war without desired levels of support. The military

conducted itself according to traditions established during the Civil War and remained professional. Civil-military relations again avoided a test.

D.   COLD WAR DAMAGE TO CIVILIAN SUPREMACY

Victory in the Second World War, ironically, marked the end of silent military acceptance of civilian supremacy. The U.S. armed forces abandoned its self-imposed isolation from policy and strategy issues. This triggered, within society, a renewal of the belief that military influence in these areas was inherently dangerous and a threat to democratic values. (Johnson, 1995)

The Cold War forced the United States to maintain a large military force and defense budget and also led to a high number of decisions that required military input. Cold War decisions often intersected the political, diplomatic, and strategic realms. Some felt that the familiarity and constant interaction eroded the respect that had previously led to military self-deprecation.(Weigley, 1993, p56) The risk of escalation of conflicts into nuclear war blurred the distinction between military and political decisions. "U.S. national security strategy was forced to become holistic, making a clear delineation of functions and responsibilities difficult (Johnson, 1995)."

Cold War security requirements forced changes to occur in the military organization. The National Security Act of 1947 was designed to maintain effective civilian control over a larger armed force while improving the ability for the military to provide advice to statesmen. The law created the Department of Defense to improve interservice

cooperation and provided for a civilian to head this department. To further ensure that military influence in this position was limited, the President was to nominate a candidate who would then have to be confirmed by the Senate. The candidate was also prohibited from having served as a military officer for a minimum of ten years prior to his nomination. The Secretary of Defense was given the authority to control all facets of the military services pertaining to policy, budgets, programs, and even operations. The Secretary of Defense was also placed in the direct chain-of-command between the President and the Unified and Specified Commands. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the Chairman of the JCS were purposely excluded from the chain-of-command because of their initial non-operational roles. Many important positions within the defense establishment were also ordered by law to be filled by civilians. These positions include the deputy secretary, the under secretaries, and assistant secretaries of defense. (Libby, 1992) With this legislation "...a tenuous equilibrium was reached between the desire to limit military influence and the need for it." (Johnson, 1995) This Act was unable to prevent further erosion of civil-military relations. The respite from serious challenge enjoyed by the system of civilian supremacy had ended.

Civil-military relations were severely tested by the Korean War and the Vietnam War. Civilian leaders saw the military's insistence on fighting a full-scale war as risky and irresponsible in the nuclear age. General MacArthur's conflict with President Truman over the extent of

the Korean War "...precipitated one of the most serious civil-military crises in U.S. history." (Johnson, 1995) In Vietnam the military chafed at fighting a war under policy restraints that they felt prevented victory and cost lives unnecessarily. (Weigley, 1995, p56) Civilian policy makers were frustrated with an Army that insisted on fighting a conventional war against a foe who was employing a Marxist people's war. (Johnson, 1995)

The competition between different branches of the armed forces has been used by civilian leaders to lessen the overall political power of the military. Disputes between the services over weapons systems and other budgetary matters divided the services. President Eisenhower was able to use this division to blunt the military's opposition to his security strategy of "massive retaliation." The Army opposed this strategy and the Navy and Air Force supported it because of the technical weapons systems that the Navy and Air Force hoped to gain. When President Kennedy and his Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, took over, they introduced a program of managerial efficiency and operations research. McNamara also partially shifted the brainpower advantage away from the services by enlarging his staff. All the services were threatened by this shift of influence and by their lack of understanding of these new processes. (Johnson, 1995) They unified their opposition to these changes and the conduct of the Vietnam War.

The combination of reduced miliary influence in government and reduced military control of warfighting became dangerous to civilian control. "In other countries, such a precipitous decline in the power and

autonomy of the military might have sparked a coup..." (Johnson, 1995) Fortunately, the U.S. military fought back using calmer methods. The services began to work together to lessen the ability of civilians to play the services off against each other. A comprehensive plan was implemented to educate the officer corps on all aspects of congressional decision making and the budgetary process. Graduate education programs were expanded to increase the corporate knowledge within the military and to regain leverage. Political contacts in industry and Congress were developed and improved and an increased understanding of international relations and national security was nurtured at the war colleges. (Johnson, 1995) These initiatives reflected a drastic change in military thinking when compared to the Civil War period.

The Cold War period also signaled the end of the traditional, citizen soldier. Deterrence required an "in place" military force instead of one that was designed to mobilize in times of crisis. Military service became less of an obligation to the country in a time of need and more like a regular job. Service in the armed forces was no longer a rite of passage and also lost its ability to compete with the higher standards of living available to the population. As a result of these changes, and a political need to demilitarize or de-mobilize at the close of the Vietnam War, conscription was ended. (Janowitz, 1979, p171) On June 30, 1973, the U.S. military became an all voluntary force and changed civil-military relations.

The all-volunteer force introduced compositional changes within the military and a possible permanent shift in military corporate thought. The enlisted ranks of the armed forces began to show a trend toward a higher percentages of minorities than what existed in society. There was also a greater representation from the lower, and lower middle income levels of society in both the enlisted and officer ranks. The South and Southwest also provided a disproportionate number of officers. Additionally, the service academies classes began drawing more from the children of career military families as early as 1978. (Janowitz, 1979, p201) There was fear in the late seventies that such recruiting patterns would increase "...the possibility of an officer corps that would become 'isolated' from the larger society or, at the least, maintaining very specialized and narrow linkages with the civilian society." (Janowitz, 1979, p191)

The all-volunteer force transitional process heightened the siege mentality of the military. Those who volunteered perceived a lack of respect from the civilian elites and the press. Surveys showed that the general public had high confidence in the armed forces and that they agreed that the press had treated them unfairly. The high cost per-soldier of the all-volunteer force also increased government efforts to find ways of reducing costs. Prime targets included military retirement programs and entitlements. This also increased the military's fear and discontent with its civilian bosses. (Janowitz, 1979, p204)

E. POST COLD WAR PROBLEMS

Motives for reform came from within the military as well as from Congress. Normal bureaucratic yearning for influence is cited as an internal motive. The JCS may simply have sought greater ability to influence foreign policy relations. (Johnson, 1995) Some argue that

> ...the Joint Chiefs campaigned consistently both to secure statutory authority for a military voice in deliberations on national policy and strategy, and through public pronouncements to influence policy-making in ways that will guard them against a repetition of waging war under the constraints against the application of overwhelming power that prevailed in Korea and Vietnam. (Weigley, 1993, p57)

The need for reform was underscored by the failure of the Iranian hostage rescue operation known as "Desert One." President Carter overstepped the bounds of civilian involvement by taking personal control of many details of the operation. This deep involvement and the inability of the services to work together heightened calls for reform.

Congress pushed for change from without. Unsatisfied with military adaptation to changing world condition, Congress wanted reform of defense operations, acquisitions, and planning capabilities. Congressional prerogatives culminated in the 1986 Department of Defense Reorganization Act sponsored by Republican Senator Barry Goldwater of Arizona and Democratic Congressman Bill Nichols of Alabama. This act, officially listed as Public Law 99-433, became known as the Goldwater-Nichols Act and is central to the discussion of the possible crisis in U.S. civil-military relations.

Subjective control of the military may be reaching the end of its usefulness.

> ...it may be that Samuel Huntington was correct in his evaluation of the American variety of civil control of the military as a subjective civilian control, perilous because of a relative absence of objective institutional safeguards.
> (Weigley, 1993, p57)

Americans can not rely on the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans to provide isolation. Economic ties and long range weapons have forced the United States to interact in the international community as a superpower. The mobilizing military has become a standing military with its own corporate interests and beliefs. These changes stress the conventions of U.S. civil-military relations which were established in vastly different conditions.

III. IS THERE A CRISIS IN U.S. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS?

Changing world and domestic conditions are challenging traditional implementation of civilian control over the military. Civil-military relations may be changed to meet the challenge or may the United States may see a failure in its maintenance of civilian supremacy. Stresses are beginning to cause problems within the United States. These problems may indicate an existing or impending crisis in civil-military relations. A crisis will be defined as the loss of civilian control of the military. The following sections will present examples of tension between the armed forces and civilian leaders and argue whether they are a sign of a crisis. Though these examples show a negative trend in civil-military relations that may lead to crisis, they do not support the existence of a present crisis.

A. RELEVANCE OF DISCUSSION

There are many events which are cited as symptoms of a crisis in U.S. civil-military relations. Former Chairman of the JCS, Admiral William Crowe, using the prestige and influence of his recently vacated military position, publicly endorsed a presidential candidate and campaigned on his behalf. By proclaiming his support of candidate Bill Clinton in 1992, he violated the military's self-imposed tradition of isolation from active political participation. (Snider, 1995, p1) Another issue that caused more direct conflict between the military and the Congress was the debate on the role of women in combat. Amidst fervent

opposition from the military services, and the media noise over the Tailhook Scandal, Congress lifted the ban on women flying combat missions and serving aboard combatant naval vessels. The conflict escalated when the Clinton administration ordered all the military branches to increase the number of women in combat positions. The military protested publicly and used bureaucratic procedures to slow implementation of this order. (Snider, 1995, p1)

The third example is the contentious relationship between the armed forces and President Clinton. Senator Helms supported and voiced the military's feelings by making comments which proclaimed that the military would be actively antagonistic toward the President if he were to visit military installations. The final incident involved General Colin Powell and his actions while serving as the Chairman of the JCS (CJCS). He used the press to publicly debate the use of U.S. military forces in Bosnia and expressed public discontent with the lifting of the ban on homosexuals serving in the military. His actions were counter to the idea that civilian leaders should make political decisions with military advice and that the military's responsibility was to publically support and implement these decisions. (Snider, 1995, pp1-3) These incidents have led to the belief that there is a severe problem in civil-military affairs.

The Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, is the focal point of those looking for the cause of the civil-military crisis. The Goldwater-Nichols Act increased the power of the military and threatened civilian

supremacy. (Johnson, 1995) Though the reforms implemented by the act

were designed to increase effectiveness, they had the unintended effect of

concentrating all the power of the military establishment and placing it

in the hands of the CJCS.

> The scandal in question is nothing less than the collapse of
> civilian control over the military policies and military
> strategy of the United States. Without even the need of a
> coup d'etat, the power of decision that our civilian President
> is supposed to exercise...has been seized by...the Joint
> Chiefs of Staff. (Luttwak, 1994)

During Desert Storm, Snider argues, the CJCS was also able to

circumvent laws that prevented him from having operational command of

troops. The problems have not subsided and deserve additional attention

(Snider, 1995, p3)

Changing roles for the military are also cited as a possible cause

for the strain in civil-military relations. These trends are

1. Changes in the international system and, thus, in the
   U.S. strategic response
2. The rapid drawdown of the military
3. Domestic demands on the military and society's cultural
   imperatives
4. The increased role of non-traditional missions for the
   military
   (Snider, 1995, p8)

President Clinton's problems with the military, the effects of the

Goldwater-Nichols Act, General Powell's role in the alleged crisis and the

changing roles of the military will be examined will be examined in the

remainder of this chapter.

B.   THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION'S MILITARY PROBLEMS

President Clinton entered office with a reputation as a draft dodger and as someone who had little understanding of, or need for, the military. There was wide dissemination of a letter he wrote to a Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) commander during the Vietnam war, in which he voiced sympathy for those that loved their country but hated the military.(Eitelberg, 1995, p49) His administrations relationship with the military started poorly and worsened. Several events underscored the lack of respect and, at times, open hostility of the armed forces toward the new President. The Commander-in-Chief was being challenged on his qualifications to command. Continuing problems indicate that severe strain exists in U.S. civil-military relations.

While visiting the aircraft carrier U.S.S. Theodore Roosevelt, during his first visit to a military installation as Commander-in-Chief, he was greeted with catcalls and comments such as, "Maybe we can call this his military service, three hours is more than he had before." (Bacevich, 1993) This occurred despite a preemptive visit by the Commander of the Atlantic Fleet and his orders to the personnel to be respectful toward the new President. This type of order should have been unnecessary. A *Washington Post* reporter covering the event wrote that there was a pervasive sense of mockery throughout the command with many jokes targeted at Hillary and Chelsea Clinton.

The lack of mutual respect between the military and the Clinton administration was evident in the White House and at military

gatherings. A member of Clinton's staff refused to shake the hand of a highly decorated general and stated that she did not deal with or speak to anyone in uniform. The Pentagon leaked news of the incident to embarrass the President (Bacevich, 1993). During a White House party for the Democratic National Committee, high ranking military officers were instructed to carry trays of appetizers (Eitelberg, 1995, p49)

The Air Force Chief of Staff issued an order to the entire U.S. Air Force, commanding them to respect the President and to behave accordingly. His success was no better than that of the Atlantic Fleet Commander. (Kohn, 1994, p3) During an Air Force unit's formal dinner, the guest speaker, a major general, criticized the President for smoking marijuana, draft dodging, and womanizing. The general, in turn, was relieved for his indiscretion.

In a *Washington Post* editorial, two active service officers voiced their anger towards the President's intention to allow gays to serve openly in the military. They scolded the service chiefs for not being more strident and effective in their opposition to these plans. They then warned the President that a military officer was sworn to protect the Constitution and not the Commander-in-Chief. They were, in effect, telling the President that he had to earn their respect and loyalty. (Bacevich, 1993)

A senior Congressman witnessed the antagonism while visiting the Army's Command and General Staff College. During a talk about the Congress' role and powers, he received repeated jeers. (Towers, 1994)

When he continued to lecture the class on the subject, catcalls replaced jeers, especially at any mention of the President. (Kohn, 1994, p3)) The increasingly partisan outlook of the military was shown during an award ceremony for Senator Strom Thurmond. The audience, made up of the Association of the United States Army, applauded loudly when the speaker noted that the Senator had switched from the Democratic Party to the Republican Party in 1964. (Kohn, 1994, p3)

A more severe test of civilian supremacy occurred as a result of the Tailhook Association scandal. When the investigation ended, Secretary of the Navy, John Dalton felt that the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) had to be held accountable. When he asked for Admiral Kelso's resignation, the Admiral refused. The Secretary of Defense then supported the Admiral's position, citing the Admiral's support of the administrations policy on women in combat.(Bacevich, 1993) By his actions, the CNO was able to challenge civilian authority and create dissent among key civilian leaders in the Department of Defense. The military disaster in Somalia, where many special forces personnel were killed, was attributed to the Secretary of Defense's decision not to reinforce U.S. troops. Angered members of the military actively tried to undermine Les Aspin by offering a steady stream of rumors and press leaks to the *Washington Times* (Kohn, 1994, p3).

Richard Kohn writes that

The U.S. Military is now more alienated from its civilian leadership than at any time in American history, and more vocal about it. The warning signs are very clear, most

> noticeably in the frequency with which officers have expressed disgust for the President over the last year. (Kohn, 1994, p3)

In response to this statement, one writer warns that the words "United States" and "American" in Kohn's statement could easily be replaced by Chile, South Africa, or North Korea. These nations are known to have poor civil-military relations. It is very surprising and unpleasant that the statement applied so well to the United States. (Towers, 1994)

Although the President is the target of military scorn, he is not personally responsible for the changes which have occurred in civil-military relations. He entered office after the end of the Cold War which signaled drastic changes in military doctrine. The military's influence and prestige, built up during the Cold War, were bolstered by success during the Desert Storm campaign. The most powerful and politically oriented military leader since the Second World War, General Colin Powell, was the CJCS, a position which itself was strengthened by the Goldwater-Nichols Act. (Towers, 1994; Johnson, 1995) As the "...least experienced or interested Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. armed forces for at least 60 years (Towers, 1994)," the President was severely disadvantaged. The hostility toward military matters expressed by members of his administration aggravated the problem. The military has also found an ally in a population that was disenchanted with politicians. The laws put in place by the Goldwater-Nichols Act also played a key role in enhancing the power of the military relative to the civilian leadership. The Act influenced the Clinton Administration's civil-military relations by

consolidating and, thereby, enhancing the power of the senior military leader.

President Clinton's problems with the military do not signify that he is the cause of tensions in civil-military relations. They are only a symptom of other changes which have placed stress on the system. Any president in his situation, faced with the increased political and legal power of the armed forces and declining military experience in the political leadership, would have faced similar problems. There will be presidents and administrations in the future which will face antagonism from the military because of these changes and the changing structure of U.S. society.

C.   GOLDWATER-NICHOLS AND MILITARY POWER

The Goldwater-Nichols Act was passed in an environment of military opposition. Admiral Crowe was joined by Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger in voicing concerns over the strengthening of the CJCS. Desch argues that by naming the CJCS as the principle military advisor to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense, the law dramatically increased military influence and challenged the civilian control achieved by Robert McNamara. "The military grew more unified and less amenable to civilian control. (Desch, 1995, p167)"

John Lehman, former Secretary of the Navy, responded to Richard Kohn's article "Out of Control, The Crisis in Civil-Military Relations" by writing,

Civilian control, as the term is generally understood and certainly as it was intended by the Founding Fathers, has been eliminated by years of well meaning reform legislation, culminating in the Goldwater-Nichols Act, drafted almost entirely by military staff officers from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the committee staffs. ...In their understandable quest for efficiency, the military reformers have consolidated the power previously separated between the military departments, disenfranchised the civilian officials of each service, and created autocracy in the Joint Staff and arbitrary power in the person of the Chairman. (Powell, Lehman, Odom, Huntington, and Kohn, 1994, p24)

Richard Kohn answered by supporting the call to enhance the power of,

...the Office of the Secretary of Defense, which I believe needs to be strong in order to balance the service staffs and the Joint Staff, now so much more important after the Goldwater-Nichols law. (Powell et al, 1994, p30)

Some argue that the Goldwater-Nichols Act was outdated when the Cold War ended.

Goldwater-Nichols was a reform movements's attempt to build a military for long-term competition with the Soviet Union. The environment has changed, however,... (Bracken, 1995, p161)

By making the CJCS an official member of the National Security Council, the Goldwater-Nichols Act gave the CJCS the right to give advice whenever he chose and not just when he was asked. This also signaled Congressional acceptance of the JCS belief that civilian interference had caused failed operations. (Johnson, 1995) Furthermore, the CJCS was no longer required to present a consensus view from the service chiefs. He was free to offer whatever advice he chose despite what the JCS believed. With personal control of the Joint Staff and with the

second-highest ranking officer in the military as his direct subordinate, the CJCS became more powerful. (Kohn, 1994, p9)

As early as 1991, there were concerns over the possible rivalry which could develop between the chairman and the Secretary of Defense. The increasingly political nature of joint service positions could also reduce the promotion of those with operational experience in exchange for those with political savvy. This would make the military forces politically capable but hurt its combat abilities (Campbell,1991). The Goldwater-Nichols may have improved planning for large, multi-service operations, but may, in the end, hurt the military and civil-military relations.

General Powell used the power provided to him by the Goldwater-Nichols act to win a war and then retired to civilian life. Wisdom, however, warns us that we cannot count on the good intentions of those we put in power. This leads us to be cautious and circumspect when assigning powers and establishing checks and balances. Colin Powell was able to overcome even the legal limitations of his power to wage an effective war. A future CJCS may not be motivated by such altruistic goals. Legislators and military leaders should be aware of the problems inherent in the Goldwater-Nichols Act.

D.   GENERAL COLIN POWELL/CAUSE OR EFFECT?

The Cold War and the Goldwater-Nichols Act laid the foundation for military domination of strategic decision making and the lessening of

civilian control. The men who served as the Chairmen built upon this foundation.

> By the time Goldwater-Nichols was passed, civilian control had already been eroding, and though the Act certainly furthered the process, it was not fully consummated until the accession of General Colin Powell. (Luttwak, 1994)

Admiral Crowe proceeded General Powell and laid the groundwork for General Powell so a short discussion is relevant. Crowe was the first CJCS to serve under the reorganized defense structure and did his part to increase military influence. He felt the CJCS was obligated to give overall advice and should not limit his advice to only distinctly military matters. He also believed that high ranking military officers should understand and influence Congressional politics, public affairs, and foreign affairs. Because of his beliefs, he supported the Goldwater-Nichols Act despite opposition from his boss and the separate service chiefs.

Admiral Crowe's influence was different from that of General Powell, however, because he preferred to work behind the scenes. He was successful in playing off different civilian organizations and politicians against each other to get his way and even opened his own diplomatic channels with Soviet leaders. (Kohn, 1994, p8) General Powell was more outspoken and bold.

General Powell effectively combined the legal power of his position with his own political skills to become "...the most influential JCS chairman in U.S. history," (Johnson, 1995) He became known as a political general who pushed the margins of military autonomy and

threatened civil-military relations. (Cohen, 1995) He became, not only the most popular military leader since Eisenhower, he also became the most political since MacArthur and the most powerful since Marshall. (Kohn, 1994, p9) He was therefore able to overrule the overmatched President Clinton on issues such as homosexuals in the military, military participation in the former Yugoslavia, and post-Cold War military budgets. (Luttwak, 1994)

Scholars believe "...it was during (his) tenure that civilian control eroded most since the rise of the military establishment in the 1940s and 1950s." (Kohn, 1994, p9;Johnson, 1995) It was the manner in which he used power, rather than his possession of power that seemed to threaten civilian supremacy. He chose to criticize and debate President Clinton's policy on homosexuals in the military in a very public manner, and, therefore, seemed to condone defiance from all ranks of the armed forces. Subordinates felt free to criticize and debate the issues. He also wrote an editorial in *The New York Times* which explained why the United States should avoid committing troops to Bosnia. In "Why General's Get Nervous," he chided those who would send military forces into Bosnia without clear goals. He cited President Bush as a president that understood the use of military force and implied that the Clinton Administration did not understand.(Powell, 1992) This open debate was also covered in the press by papers such as *The Phoenix Gazette,* again undermining Presidential prerogative. (Grady, 1995)

Richard Kohn argues that General Powell also took it upon himself to design a new, national security policy without consulting the JCS, the President, or the Secretary of Defense. Despite dissenting opinions from the Secretary of Defense, the Base Force Concept and a 25% reduction in force levels was presented to Congress, he actively campaigned for its approval. Kohn, who believes that there is a crisis, also argues that Gulf War planning and conduct was manipulated by General Powell to conform to his views on warfare. He effectively insulated the President from dissenting advice and made sure that all reports were channeled through him. By doing this, he had virtual operational control of the combatant commanders and violated the established chain-of-command that legally does not include the JCS or the CJCS. (Kohn, 1994, p10-13)

General Powell answered critics in an article for the *National Interest*. He said that there was not a problem with civil-military relations during his tenure. Civilian control of him and his operations was effective and absolute under both Presidents, Bush and Clinton, and both Secretaries of Defense, Cheney and Aspin. He also noted that both Presidents expressed satisfaction with his performance and advice. According to the now retired Colin Powell, those looking for a crisis should turn elsewhere. (Powell, 1994, p23) His effect on civil-military relations would be important simply because of the debate and concern he seemed to have caused.

As with the military problems faced by the Clinton Administration, Colin Powell's power was a sign of structural changes and not due

exclusively to his political prowess. New legislation and growing acceptance of political behavior within the defense establishment made his expansive influence possible. If Colin Powell had not taken advantage of these possibilities, future military leaders would eventually have done so to their advantage.

The Goldwater-Nichols Act and General Powell's expansive powers have increased the military's influence, but they did not change the military's outlook. Changes in beliefs and goals are not brought about by legislation or the leadership of one man. These changes are brought about by changes in society. The demographic changes occurring in the United States are creating the conditions where a new "military thought" could develop.

E. CHANGING ENVIRONMENT FOR THE ARMED FORCES

The end of the Cold War and fading memories of the Desert Storm Campaign caused Americans to focus inward again. Historical lack of interest in international affairs and unwillingness to fund or tolerate large, standing militaries forced the downsizing of the armed forces. Some civilian and military leaders have increasingly offered military assets and personnel to perform more domestic missions and operations other than war (OOTW). These new tasks are changing the direction of military planning and training. Domestic issues are again the focus of the citizens while political leaders must face the problems of a mounting national deficit. Defense funding will necessarily fall, with competition for available budget dollars becoming more intense. Unfortunately, these

changes are placing a strain on the U.S. military at the same time that changing demographics have increased the power of other groups competing for funding and have decreased military experience within the government.

1. Downsizing and Isolation

America is using the end of the Cold War as an opportunity to return to a behavioral pattern that was prevented by our Cold War role as a superpower. A typical reaction to the conclusion of conflict was the response of the United States after the First World War. James F. McIsaac and Naomi Verdugo quoted a passage from Walter Lippmann's *U.S. Foreign Policy, Shield of the Republic*, in their 1995 article. This quotation is a perfect description of U.S. tendencies.

> Unable to say who was friend or who was foe, who was our ally and who was our enemy, we had no practical measure of what was meant by the words "adequate national defense." Adequate against whom? Adequate with the help of whom? The word "adequate" had no meaning, and thus the real measure of our military preparation was not what would be needed to win a probable war but what Congress, belabored by the pacifists, militarists, the domestic pressure groups, and the taxpayers, agreed to appropriate money for. (Lippman, 1943, p70 quoted in McIsaac, 1995, p21)

America is again eager to reap the benefits of the "peace dividend."

Many approaches were used to decrease military spending. Manning throughout all four services was reduced and U.S. force levels in Europe and Asia were decreased. The reduced manning requirements forced many officers out of the military service and prevented others from attaining career promotion goals. Infrastructure reductions were

controlled by the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Committee. This committee asked the branches to decide which bases could be closed and which bases could be reconfigured to better serve military needs while reducing costs.

Congress modified military recommendations based on strategic and tactical needs to meet political needs to distribute military contracts and programs throughout different constituencies. In the end, military leaders were even more disillusioned by political expedients which overrode expertise. The military forces started to became more centralized and insulated. They were centralized by the movement of most of our forces to the East and West Coasts of the United States. An example of this is the movement of most Navy facilities and commands to Norfolk, Virginia, and San Diego, California. Military forces became more isolated because fewer people in fewer areas of the nation would have contact with military personnel. As a result, less of the population would understand or have a stake in the armed forces. (Blazer, 1996, p1)

The reduction in size also led the armed forces to reduce inputs to the officer corps from the different accession programs. ROTC commands located at U.S. universities and colleges provided fewer officers in proportion to the military academies. With fewer officers entering receiving commissions through these sources, a twenty year trend has become troubling. Since the end of conscription in 1973, the idea of the "citizen soldier" has died way. Once the backbone of our military tradition, officers and enlisted men drawn for short periods of time from

diverse civilian occupations are now a rarity. "The *Reserve* Officers

Training Corps has been transformed into the *Regular* Officers Training

Corps by the introduction of scholarships and regular commission

(Powell et al, 1994, p24, original author's emphasis)." John Lehman cites

several figures to support his contention that the military is becoming

isloated. He states that military service by civilians over 50 years in age

holding leadership positions is about 80% while military service among

their children is less than 10%. Cadets and midshipmen at the Military

and Naval Academy who are children of career military parents is at a

record high. "The symptoms are legion. We have created a separate

military caste (Powell et al, 1994, p24)."

The debate over the end of conscription in the late 1960s and

1970s centered around the fear that an all-voluntary military would

become praetorian or mercenary. There were also arguments that the lack

of civilian participation would increase public apathy for military affairs,

leaving the military to make needed decisions. A powerful alliance

between the military and the defense industry was also predicted to

develop. A military, under these conditions, would have independent

professional ideas and political views and would be isolated from,

resentful of, and suspicious of civilians. It was also projected to become

less concerned with the ethics of the use of force. (Eitelberg, 1995, p63)

This debate subsided after the end of conscription in the United States,

Great Britain, and Canada did not result in an uncontrollable armed

force.

The all-volunteer force may again be seen as a problem for the United States. Downsizing and disengagement from many areas in the United States decreases how well military personnel reflect the demographics of the nation. As the army becomes filled with more careerists, a military mind set may develop which is at odds with that of society. (Segal, 1995, p195) Taken to an extreme, a military that is too insular may become myopic, unresponsive, and removed from civil priorities and concerns. (McIsaac, 1995, p30) Navy Under Secretary Richard Danzig shares this view. A report on his lecture to the U.S. Naval Institute summarized his belief that "...if the Navy doesn't keep up with society's changing demographics and ideas, the time may come when the Navy is seen as alien and undeserving of moral and financial support." (Blazer, 1996) Huntington would argue that a small and politically sterile military is the best option for maintaining civilian control, however, the present military has been weaned on the Cold War and Goldwater-Nichols. It is doubtful that it would return to political isolation when political influence is so important to military survival and effectiveness.

The greatest danger to civil-military relations in the United States in the creation of a military that is ideologically distinct from society yet politically involved and influential. The body of the armed forces would feel threatened or alienated and the leadership would understand how to create change in the national government. These conditions would make the military more willing to force policy decisions to favor military

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objectives and would feel less constrained by public opinion or need.

2.   Changing Demographics

Demographics in the United States are changing. McIsaac, who has an extreme view of danger from changing demographics, employs several figures to support his argument. He indicates that immigration is contributing more to population growth than births, accounting for over one-third of the growth from 1980 to 1995. Minority groups make up a larger portion of the population. Minorities are 26 percent of the United States, up from 12 percent in 1970. Census projections show that this will rise to over 30 percent by the year 2000. The aging of the "Baby Boom Generation" is also having a strong effect on demographics because of the sheer size of this segment of society. Thirteen percent of the population are over 65 years of age and the median age in the United States is 34 years. These figures were 10 percent and 28 in 1970 and the median age is expected to reach 37 by 2010. As a result, more people will be drawing from Federal entitlements such as Social Security, veteran's benefits, and Medicare, and fewer people will be available to share the load of payments needed to keep these programs running (McIsaac,1995, p23). Though these figures are skewed by changes to definitions of minorties during these periods, the trend shows that changing demographics will increase pressure for cuts in military spending.

Though budgetary pressures from these demographic changes will make funding for military programs more difficult, the greater problem lies elsewhere. The demographic change that most damages civil-military

relations is the growing lack of military experience and knowledge amongst civilian leaders. The Baby Boom generation now controls positions of power throughout society. They were children of the 1960s and include those who avoided the draft, marched in support of peace, and derided the military. To many in this generation, military personnel were too willing to wage war while politicians and industry leaders were the "establishment." The armed forces must interact with those which had criticized and attacked the military and now hold important and influential positions.

Where military service used to be a stepping stone to political leadership, the avoidance of military service is now a common part of many politician's lives. The result goes beyond a sense of mutual distrust between military leaders and the civilians that they feel have shirked their duty. The lack of military experience among the elites in the nations continues to grow and could damage civil-military relations.

> This is a level of unfamiliarity that will only expand in the years ahead as more and more baby boomers take charge and the all-volunteer military...produces fewer and fewer veterans who will rise to positions of influence. (Eitelberg, 1995, p38)

The statistics bear out the lack of military experience in our government. Only eighteen percent of the men aged 39 to 50 within the Clinton administration have had military service compared to over 40 percent of the general population in this age bracket. The White House has only eight percent. Even the news media, normally at odds with the military establishment, noted that if you "...don't know AWOL from

AWACS, ...send the White House your resume." (Eitelberg, 1995, p49)

The media is also made up of a high proportion of those who lack

military knowledge and who have a negative view of the armed forces. As

William Kennedy wrote in his book, *The Military and the Media: Why The*

Press Cannot Be Trusted to Cover a War, there is an increasing antipathy

between the military and the press.

> A basic problem...involves the ignorance and inexperience--
> or 'military illiteracy' --of the press, which tends to rely on
> 'English, sociology, and political science majors' rather than
> the on people familiar with the intricacies of modern
> warfare. Except for a tiny handful of its members...the press
> lacks the training, time, and means to make sense of defense
> information. Why then should journalists utterly ignorant
> and inexperienced in the history, language, organization,
> methods, and technology of the subject they are covering...be
> permitted to roam about at will and to report without
> effective supervision? (Kennedy, Eitelberg, 1995, p40)

The distrust between the media and the military germinated and

grew during the Vietnam War and helped the military decide to politicize

its interests. Recently, reporters protested the way in which they were

controlled during Desert Storm. The military gave them access to only

what the military wanted them to see. This helped to prevent the "CNN

effect" from having a negative impact on combat operations and security.

Control of the press during the war, however, heightened the antagonism

between the military and the media. This may lead to further tension

between military and civilian elites. (Eitelberg, 1995, p62)

The demographic trends in the United States are not expected to

reverse themselves. The aging population, increasing use if entitlements,

and high levels of immigration will draw funds away from the armed

forces. The leaders in industry, media, and government are becoming less and less experienced in military affairs. This can cause military and strategic decisions to be voluntarily given to military leaders, making them more entangled with politics and reducing civilian control. (Eitelberg. 1995, p62) It could also cause growing distrust and resentment toward the governing elites making the military even more insular and giving it a sense of persecution and danger. Finally, the politicians making policy and defense decisions could become insensitive to military problems and funding needs, hurting the effectiveness of the armed forces.

3. Operations Other Than War (OOTW)

Budget constraints, the lack of an enemy easily understood by the American people, and a focus on domestic problems have caused forces within government and the armed forces to push for military involvement in missions other than those for which it is designed. The military must devote a significant amount of time and resources to perform OOTW domestically and in support of foreign interests. The debate on whether performing these mission degrades military effectiveness is heated.

Military forces are well organized and equipped to handle varying situations. Because of the military's efficiency and its strong devotion to national well-being, "...the tendency for some Americans to actively solicit ways for the military to get involved in non-warfighting domestic tasks seems to be growing." (McIsaac, 1995, p31) Missions include security patrols in Washington, D.C. and in downtown Chicago housing

areas, youth training and support programs, and disaster relief. There is also a growing law enforcement role for the military. Counter-narcotics operations in the Caribbean, security patrols during the riots in Los Angeles, and maintenance of refugee collection areas have all been tasks assigned to the military. (Desch, 1995, p176) The debate centers on how the military is affected by these changes in focus.

Those on one side of the debate assert that these problems are not the responsibility of the armed forces and that they waste resources which could and should be used for training and equipment. They also believe that it is dangerous for civil-military relations because of the deep involvement in politics and local issues required for these missions.

> [T]here is growing fear that domestic and international missions of a nonmilitary nature will undermine military effectiveness. Second, and more importantly, a growing internal focus could undermine civilian control of the military. (Desch, 1995, p176)

Today's military is more homogenous in thought, more unified in actions, more active politically, more accepted in traditionally civilian missions, and led by less experienced civilian officials. Intervention, which had been deterred by lack of legitimacy, internal competition, and political inability is slowly being removed. In these conditions, it is dangerous for the military to have a focus on domestic issues rather on preparing for an external threat. The military may come to believe that it can and should intervene in government to solve domestic problems.

Opponents of this view argue that the national interest includes domestic problems and, thus, the military is a perfect asset for correcting

these problems. Public confidence in the armed forces is higher than for any other government organization. The people also see the military as a stabilizing force during crises or disasters. Some feel that military manpower could be used to rebuild inner cities and military personnel scould serve as role models. Service in the armed forces is also seen as an effective way of instilling citizenship and discipline. They cite successful programs such as the Marine Corps' Toys for Tots program, the Personnel Excellence Partnership Program, and volunteer efforts by the armed forces in communities surrounding military bases. (Gilroy, 1995, p73)

The military supports the first view and believes that, despite the need to "... make greater efforts to communicate what 'value added' the armed forces bring to society (McIsaac, 1995, p29)," social services should not be provided by the military. Resources must be used to maintain combat readiness, a task already made difficult by funding cuts. (Gilroy, 1995, p72) The voluntary nature of many community support programs, before the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993 made these programs possible without reducing the time devoted to military matters. Military forces are now officially tasked by this Act to provide assistance to civilian groups on matters varying from preserving environmental conditions to improving equal opportunity to providing training and schooling. (Gilroy, 1995, p74) These programs now detract from time spent on strictly military matters.

As OOTW become more numerous and the number of personnel shrink, the operational tempo must increase. Constant or increasing

international obligations must compete with OOTW for fewer personnel and platforms, reducing downtime for the people and the gear. Longer deployments, less time with family, and less time for training are the resultant drawbacks for military personnel. Equipment is also accumulating hours and miles at a higher rate and is thus at a lower level of readiness as maintenance schedules tighten. Limited military budgets are spent to support missions when other government agencies already have responsibility and expertise in a given mission area. Domestic goals "...deserve support up to but not beyond a very clear line. This line is crossed when the military's training and thus its budget requests for equipment and money are driven by noncombat missions." (Cropsey, 1993, Gilroy, 1995, p79) Some argue that the armed forces should begin training specifically for such non-traditional missions. If this is the case, the assumption can be made that the military is not inherently the best organization to be performing these tasks. If training is required, therefore, maybe the civilian organizations already assigned to solve these problems can be trained instead.

F.   EXTENT OF CIVIL-MILITARY PROBLEMS

The armed forces are facing many challenges after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Stress from downsizing, reduced budgets, mandated personnel changes and changes within society will not subside for many years. Demographic changes will continue to set the military apart from the population and reduced numbers of service personnel and basing will worsen this isolation. Military leaders are more political and more

influential while their civilian counterparts are less capable and less interested in military matters. Finally, the armed forces may lose combat effectiveness as domestic and humanitarian missions grow more prevalent. Combined, these changes could lead to inappropriate military influence in government and could increase the chances of military defeat in the field.

The ultimate collapse of the U.S. system of civilian supremacy over the military, by definition, would be a military seizure of power. Political power beyond what is believed to be appropriate may be undesirable, but is still within the bounds of our legal system. Excessive influence could lead to national policy which is based too much on military ideas and perceptions while a coup d'etat would destroy the constitutional system. America would no longer be the model of democracy for the world. If a coup occurred, even a return to civilian control would not repair the damage as the United States would be forever looking over its shoulder for the threat of another coup.

Few experts expect the civil-military problems facing the nation to result in a coup d'etat, but the extreme nature of this event makes it important to understand. If, as Kohn argues, one CJCS can override the President on important issues,the system is primed for another to do so in the future. It is doubtful that military isolation could become as serious a problem as some believe it to be. Military personnel maintain contact with the community through their civilian family members and friends. They often share stronger ties with civilians than they do with

fellow members of the armed forces. Additionally, servicemen are also tied to the community through marriage and through their children who do not live within the constraints of military ideas or bases. These facts can help to temper if not alleviate the sense of isolation.

The problem with the loss of military experience and sympathy within the government could be more threatening. Animosity between the governing elites and military forces is unhealthy and could make the armed forces feel alienated and threatened. This is especially important if soldiers and officers sense that their lives or the security of their families are threatened by civilian incompetence. With an understanding of politics and the lack of ability to influence it favorably by legal means, other methods may become attractive.

There is not a crisis in civil-military affairs, but there is a problem. The system has not adapted to the nations's changing military needs and world role so tensions between the military and the elites in society are growing. A politically oriented and influential military also is becoming more homogenous in beliefs. These military beliefs are also increasingly distinct from those of the populace. Problems exist and could result in a crisis or coup d'etat in the future. The theories on the causes of coups d'etat will help to determine if there is a threat of a military intervention.

IV. THEORIES ON COUPS D'ETAT

A. INTRODUCTION TO THE COUP D'ETAT

Military seizure of power would signal the ultimate failure of U.S. civil-military relations. In order to understand whether an impending crisis in civil-military relations could cause the overthrow of the civilian government by the armed forces, we must first understand what a coup d'etat consists of and what causes it to occur.

The Merriam-Webster *Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary* defines the coup d'etat as "...a sudden decisive exercise of force in politics...the violent overthrow or alteration of an existing government by a small group" (Merriam-Webster, 1984). A coup d'etat can also be defined as the use of violence to displace or supplant an existing regime or government. A similar definition of a coup d'etat is taken from the seminal work by Edward Luttwak, *Coup d'Etat, A Practical Manual.* He states that:

> A coup consists of the infiltration of a small but critical segment of the state apparatus, which is then used to displace the government from its control of the remainder. (Luttwak (1968), 1979, p27)

Luttwak's definition agrees with that of Finer because it explicitly does not require mass public support or the use of military type force. More specifically a coup d'etat is

> ...a swift, precise, operation aimed at displacing the current rulers and replacing them with oneself or one's own nominees.

resulting in the

> ...displacement, lock, stock, and barrel, of a ruling
> government and its replacement with something manifestly
> different in composition, complexion and possibly, political
> allegiance. (Ferguson, 1987, p14)

These definitions set the coup d'etat apart from revolutions, revolts, and uprisings.

Requirements for the instigators of a coup d'etat to use force is the factor that makes military involvement prevalent in coups. The soldier is now the expert on the use of violence and force and "...enjoys a near-monopoly of all effective weapons." (Finer (1962), 1988, p11) In order for a coup d'etat to be successful, the planners must either neutralize the armed forces or have them as allies. The theoretical studies of coups represented by S.E. Finer's *The Man on Horseback*, Edward Luttwak's *Coup d'Etat, A Practical Manual*, Donald L. Horowitz's *Coup Theories and Officer Motives*, and Gregor Ferguson's *Coup d'Etat, A Practical Manual* each approaches the understanding of the coup d'etat, as a phenomenon, by explaining the military's decision to intervene in the political process and to displace the government in power.

> The regime of military provenance or direct military rule is,
> in short, a distinctive kind of regime; and the military as an
> independent political force is a distinctive political
> phenomenon. (Finer (1962), 1988, p4)

The main issue is the possibility that the military in the United States would ever stage a coup d'etat.

The military must overcome the objective and subjective controls that inhibit political intervention if it decides that it should and has the ability to attempt a coup. Theories on coups have changed from the 1950s, when the first postwar coups occurred, through the 1980s. Initial theories were focused on the structural differences between a professional military and the civilian government under which it was to serve. These early theories portrayed the military as forces for modernization which were forced to exist within "traditional societies." This theory gave way to the institutional level of analysis that sees the armed forces as a unified, rational actor which simply fights for its own interests. The military is merely defending corporate interests such as pay, pensions, budget allocations, and promotions. The final trend in explaining coups d'etat viewed the military forces of a nation as fragmented or factionalized. Competition between the various groups within the military coupled with individual officer motives explains the decision to intervene. This involves a cost-benefit analysis by each individual officer. (Horowitz, 1980, pp 3-8)

The changes in theoretical approaches to the explanation of coups d'etat are evident in the chronological order of the significant publications on the subject. Finer published the first edition of his book in 1962. He focuses on the differences between the military and society. (Finer (1962), 1988) Horowitz published his text in 1980 and presented individual motives of the officers as the key to understanding the coup. (Horowitz, 1980) The goal of the remainder of this chapter will be to piece

together the most compelling arguments and recognize the factors that would be the probable causes of a coup in the United States. The execution phase of a coup is believed to be the most difficult stage of a coup d'etat. Difficulties involved in execution can either deter an attempt or prevent success.

B.   MOTIVES FOR MILITARY INTERVENTION

1.   Inhibiting Factors That Must Be Overcome

As stated earlier, participation in a coup d'etat is an unusual and risky undertaking for the participants. Many factors, which would inhibit an officer from participation, exist within society. There are, however, also factors which make success possible or military forces would never chose to intervene. A discussion of these advantages and inhibiting factors will provide the needed background for further discussions on motives and opportunity for intervention.

The military enjoys many advantages that give it the assets and the command ability to initiate and execute a coup d'etat. It possesses superior organization and unity because of its hierarchical structure. Actions and orders can be carried out faster and with more unified effort than in most civilian organizations.

Finer traces historical developments which have made the present forms of military intervention possible. He notes that the military states which existed prior to two hundred years ago were not military intervention in the modern sense. There was no political motivation, no

separate identity of the armed forces, and there was seldom the search or the need for legitimacy. They ruled by force and subjugation. (Finer (1962), 1988, p187)

Finer lists five factors or variables that have made the modern form of military intervention possible. First, the officer corps of the armed forces has become professionalized. Though this professionalism can inhibit politically motivated actions, it can in turn cause gaps to form between the goals of the politicians and the military. The second factor is the concept of and growth of nationalism that has placed the military in a position of ideological power. The armed forces are seen as the protectors of the state and symbols of independence and national identity. The third variable is also associated with nationalism. Nationalism divorced the ruler and the state. They are no longer seen as a single entity, so loyalty to the state no longer requires loyalty to the ruler.

Popular sovereignty is the fourth variable and was also made possible by nationalism. The power to grant legitimacy was transferred to the people and removed from the hands of the kings. Power can be taken by whomever gains control of the machinery of government because the monarch became expendable as a source of power. The emergence of new states from colonial rule is the final factor that allowed present forms of military intervention. As nations emerged, the cleavages of race, religion, and class re-emerged and were exacerbated by arbitrary boundaries. These cleavages can be tapped as a source of conflict and as motivation

to challenge the government. (Finer (1962), 1988, p188) Advantages of the military and the nationalist structure make the coup d'etat possible, but they do not cause officers to decide to seize power. Even the military that wishes to steal political power faces disadvantages that can inhibit it from acting.

The armed forces of a nation are seldom, if ever, qualified to run a modern nation-state. Within its own organization, the military is a self-contained society and is capable of extending this organization to run simple societies. It can provide the rudiments of law and order to a simple, subsistence, agricultural country or a single advanced city and keep the people fed. (Finer (1962), 1988, p12) As the society grows more complicated and advanced, the military is no longer able to control the situation. The services and bureaucracy required to run a metropolitan city such as New York would overwhelm the military's resources, though this task is vastly easier than the running of the entire United States. (Finer (1962), 1988, p12-19) As Attila the Hun taught, you can conquer from horseback, but you can't rule from horseback.

The armed forces also faces the lack of legitimacy in the eyes of the population and the restraint of its own professionalism. Historical civilian control of the military in nations such as the United States or Great Britain has become an almost dogmatic foundation of the culture and national identity. Any ruler or ruling group that takes power based on strength of force would be continually challenged and forced to prove its dominance and right to rule. Professional military officers are

normally inward looking. Their main concern is the effectiveness of the force. Any effort devoted to political problems would only reduce this effectiveness. Politics should be left to the politicians, especially concerning policies that have minimal ramifications for the armed forces. (Finer (1962), 1988, p20-21)

Additional inhibiting factors are based upon the armed forces' sense of self preservation. Intervention or politicalization could lead to factions within the military that in turn would decrease its effectiveness. Soldiers and sailors are also averse to firing upon each other if a conflict should arise. If the armed forces attempt to intervene and fail, their very existence could be threatened. Avoiding these situations is the best way to defend the power and unity of the armed forces. (Finer (1962), 1988, p26)

There are also individual inhibiting factors. By deciding to participate in a coup d'etat against the civilian regime, the officers are consciously deciding to do something that challenges their sense of professionalism. The undertaking is illegal, irregular, and unpredictable. An overthrow of the government may also destroy a system that has rewarded the officer for long term service and obedience. There is also no going back. Failure of the coup d'etat is very likely and the penalties are high. Death is a distinct possibility and there is almost guaranteed loss of position. (Horowitz, 1980, xi)

2. Motives Overcoming Inhibiting Factors

There must be strong reasons to make a military officer decide to participate in a coup d'etat when he is faced with such seemingly insurmountable obstacles to success and inhibiting factors. The reasons must be compelling enough for each participant to risk everything to seize power from the government each had previously served. The theories, which have attempted to explain this decision process, differ depending upon the level of analysis. The most important motive, however, is a sense of danger. Danger can come from external threats, impending collapse of the nation, challenges to military corporate interests, or from fear of conditions which threaten the individual officer. Earliest thoughts on the causes of coups d'etat saw the modernizing force of a professionalized armed force conflicting with the backward, traditional society. Given the progression of theory away from this idea of old versus new, and our concentration on a highly developed society, these theories will not be considered.

The military may see danger to the nation because of the incompetence of the civilian government that is failing to provide for proper defense from external enemies or to provide internal stability. This sense of danger can cause the armed forces as a whole to develop a desire to reform the nation. (Ferguson, 1987, p38) The stated reform could be to save the nation from a decadent or frivolous government that is leading the nation to failure. Reforms can also be attempts to restore the reputation of the nation or the spirit of its people. Economic stagnation

and hardship can create this desire to create a new order under the direction of the military. These desires for change can erupt into active opposition to the government if the system frustrates or makes these goals unattainable through normal and legal methods (Ferguson, 1987, p16).

A professional military may intervene if it feels that it is the only effective protector of the state. The armed forces see themselves as servants of the state rather than the government currently in control. In the United States, support for the ideas embodied in the Constitution would be stronger than any loyalty to the individual currently holding the office of President or Secretary of Defense. Military leaders may also believe that they are the only ones capable of deciding the structure and management of the military and view civilian control as ineffective or as interference. This is more pronounced when the civilian input is deemed dangerous or irresponsible. If the government utilizes the "professional" military to enforce domestic policy, the duty to obey civilian authorities is placed in conflict with loyalty to the nations population. Governments are thus vulnerable to those who are able to take control of the key parts of the state machine. (Luttwak (1968), 1979, p19-22)

The military could also see danger in a challenge to its vested interests. A grievance may, therefore, serve as a motive. This can be in response to humiliation that is correctly or incorrectly attributed to the civilians. The military then lashes out at those it feels has wronged it.

> ...an army that is too weak to beat a foreign enemy still has
> ample strength to cow its unarmed domestic antagonists.
> Defeat in war, moreover, is likely to undermine popular
> confidence in the existing government. The army itself-partly
> as a result of the psychological law that links frustration to
> aggression-is tempted to clear its tarnished record by finding
> a civilian scrape-goat. (Zimmerman, 1979, p399)

A military also may believe that its efforts in the field have been undermined and that there is danger to its survival in war. It sees the policies or support of the civilians as lacking and responsible for its defeats or setbacks.

Military intervention in politics has also been seen as an attempt by the armed forces to defend or improve its corporate interests. In this level of analysis, the motives are also attributed to a unitary military, but are selfish in nature. Military self preservation can become a motive for a coup d'etat if the military's ideas and political thoughts diverge from those of the society of the government. (Ferguson, 1987, p18) The military officers "...set out to protect their budgets, their autonomy, their promotions, salaries, pensions, and perquisites." (Horowitz, 1980, p6).

The military may also be composed of a dominant class that differs from that of the public or from the civilian leadership. If this dominant class feels threatened, neglected, or slighted, it could influence the armed forces to intervene in government to correct the situation in a manner favorable to the dominant class. (Finer (1962), 1988, p35) The U.S. military's officer corps is not made up of a socially, economically, or racially distinct part of the population, nor is it threatened by the

civilian population. The officers may, however, feel that the population does not understand the roles or efforts of the armed forces, but this is not caused by class differences.

Donald Horowitz would argue that there is not a distinct set of variables that cause coups to occur. He believes that there has not been a theory developed which would explain the decision to intervene, but that unpredictable combinations of motives are the cause. In his studies of a Ceylonese (Sri Lanka) coup attempt, he found that:

> Personal ambition, career frustration, family rivalry, factional organization, political intrusion into the military domain, the officer's social ties, mounting political unrest, governmental action on several policy fronts-all of these and other matters had a role in moving the Ceylonese officers to take up arms. (Horowitz, 1980, p180)

He noted that the many clefts and factions within the society made the coup d'etat easy to initiate but did not serve as a cause. The military differences with the civilian leadership also did not bring the officers to the decision that it was acceptable or preferable to participate, but did lower their thresholds significantly. Though he argues that most factors could not have individually caused intervention, the one overriding factor was the officer's sense of danger. Each officer's definition of danger and the source of this danger differed, but it was this sense of foreboding that led them to intervene. (Horowitz, 1980, p187)

Though many theories exist and each offers many motivates for military intervention, a sense of impending danger is the key factor. This danger may approach from many directions, such as within the

government or society. The source of perceived danger may differ for each participant in a coup d'etat, but the sense of danger is universal.

Military officers may possess motives to intervene in politics and thus decide to stage a coup d'etat, but, as noted earlier, are faced with obstacles that would prevent success in many situations. For a coup d'etat to gain followers and have a chance of success, there must be opportunity as well as motive. Theories also differ on what factors or events in a nation provide this opportunity. The following section will address the factors which could provide the opportunity for military intervention in the United States.

C.   OPPORTUNITY FOR MILITARY INTERVENTION

The opportunity to intervene in politics can be provided by a change in the relationship between the civilian leadership and the military. These changes can be in the form of increased dependence upon the military. A crisis can accentuate this dependence. During a domestic crisis the government may call upon the armed forces for support and then become reliant on the military. The military may then gain control of policy and learn to flex its political muscle. It may then decide that it enjoys this power and refuse to give it back to the legitimate government. If the military is popular in society and has prestige, there will be less opposition to military intervention and there may even be strong support.

Finer combines the variables of motive and opportunity to predict the intervention of the military in politics. His variables of disposition

and opportunity, which correspond to motives and opportunity, predict

intervention as shown in the following table:

Disposition	Opportunity	Intervention
No	No	No
Yes	Yes	Yes
No	Yes	Possible *
Yes	No	Failed

* Military may intervene if invited as in Burma in 1958. [1]

Table 1. Variables Leading to Intervention

Edward Luttwak considers that there is an opportunity to

intervene in the presence of three variables. These variables are economic

backwardness, political independence, and organic unity. In his theories,

the absence of these variables makes a successful coup d'etat impossible.

(Luttwak (1968), 1979, pp32-56) Political independence exists for the

United States, so it will not be discussed.

Economic backwardness makes a coup possible because it makes

the current leadership vulnerable. A citizen of the nation may have a

minimal understanding of the political system but is powerless to change

[1]Mary Callahan of the Naval Postgraduate School, National Security Affairs Department, has conducted extensive research on Burma and can provide valuable information on this particular coup d'etat.

the outcome. Political participation is limited to an elite class which is a small fraction of the population. The elites are easy to identify and serve as the focus for the frustrations of the population. The bureaucracy is usually mechanical and unable to adapt to change. Competence and technical skill are usually low and the system is unresponsive to the needs of the people. Effective local government either does not exist or is only able to maintain the status-quo. Power is centralized rather than diffused throughout the society so the common man possesses no means to voice his opinion or to seek improvement in his surroundings. Luttwak says that, though economic backwardness does not guarantee a coup will occur,

> It does mean, however, that only the intervention of special circumstances will prevent a well-planned coup from succeeding in economically backward countries, while only exceptional circumstances will allow it to succeed in the developed areas. (Luttwak (1968), 1979, p38)

Despite the wealth of the United States, some of the conditions within Luttwak's definition of economic backwardness exist within our society. There is an elite group of wealthy politicians who compete for political power among themselves, leaving the average person unable to reach these positions. Societal and monetary frustrations are often blamed on the politicians and on the inadequacies of the government. The bureaucracy, though based strongly on a meritocracy and manned by technocrats, is seen as excessively large and unable to respond to the needs of the people. Political participation also continues to drop for presidential elections. Although each individual has the right to voice

opinions through free speech and free press, the ability to make meaningful changes as an individual is severely limited. (Berke, 1996, pA-11)

According to Luttwak, coups d'etat are ineffective unless organic unity exists within the power structure of the target state. The power base must coexist with the political target. There are many situations where the actual power within a nation resided outside the structure of political rulership. Large foreign firms or businesses could exert significant power such as ARAMCO within Saudi Arabia during the late 60s and 70s. During this period ARAMCO provided 90 percent of government revenues collected in Saudi Arabia and was responsible for the development of most of the educational, infrastructure, and medical care within the country. The company became a state within a state and the government had to make decisions based on the premise of avoiding opposition from the company. (Luttwak (1968), 1979, p47-48)

Regions within the nation may also fall under the control of powers outside the direct control of the central government. Warlords may hold dominion over there own territories. Ethnic blocks may exist and regard themselves as independent of the central government. Federations with weak central governments, such as the United States in the early 1800s, possess no effective center of power for the coup planners to seize. The states would simply conduct business-as-usual. A coup that seizes power in the political center, therefore, may not affect certain regions or upon the large company organization. In effect:

The target state must have a political center. If there are several centers these must be identifiable and they must be politically, rather than ethnically, structured. If the state is controlled by a non-politically organized unit, the coup can only be carried out with its consent or neutrality. (Luttwak (1968), 1979, p55)

Based on this need for organic unity, the United States' best defenses against a successful coup d'etat may be its sheer size and complexity and its diffusion of power among fifty states. The state governments, as well as their representatives in Washington, D.C., must be cajoled or coerced into supporting any coup efforts. (Ferguson, 1987, p49)

Gregor Ferguson adds to Luttwak's definition of opportunity. Unlike Luttwak's economic or political preconditions, Ferguson argues that opportunity can actually be created by the instigators of a coup d'etat. Propaganda can be used to set up public support for military rule so, using Ferguson's definition of opportunity, coup planners can consciously create their own opportunity. (Ferguson, 1987, p25) The opportunity can also unify military and societal goals. There could be fears of foreign attack or the belief that disorder may loom in the future. The armed forces and society would, thus, both seek ways of countering the threat and be more likely to accept military intervention or rule (Horowitz, 1980, p19).

In conclusion, opportunity for intervention would arise in the United States if the public becomes disappointed in civilian leadership and the military becomes popular. Further centralization of power and

influence within the government and an increasingly unified armed forces will support this opportunity by making seizure of the government possible. The diffusion of power within the United States, the mingling of civilian and military beliefs, and the lack of legitimacy for military rulership prevent opportunity from existing.

D.   PLANNING AND EXECUTION OF THE COUP D'ETAT [2]

The planning and execution phases of a coup d'etat determine the success of a coup. Even a military force with strong motives for intervention and a very favorable opportunity to stage a coup will not succeed if these phases are not carried out with care. The planning and execution in the United States are further complicated by the openness of the society and the diffusion of political power. Basic strategies will be listed and specific application to the United States will be emphasized.

Coup planners must pursue a strategy that will give the coup d'etat the highest possibility of success. This strategy must be based upon the idea of speed. "The execution of the coup must be so planned that what is won is exactly what is required, no more and no less." (Ferguson, 1987, p47) The coup is usually attempted by a small force relative to the resources available to the target state, although the need for simultaneous operation requires a large number of people. (Luttwak (1968), 1979, p59) The planners must take control of the machinery of

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[2] Detailed discussions of the planning and execution phases of the coup d'etat can be found in books on the subject by Luttwak (1979) and Ferguson (1987) listed in the references. Only those factors which are significantly different or relevant to the United States are discussed in this paper.

government and use it to control the state. Any delay while gaining control will allow the opposition to organize and lessen the chance of presenting the nation with an event that has already occurred. Individuals and organizations that have adopted a wait-and-see posture are less likely to oppose a completed action. In the United States

> ...it is necessary to enlist the support of the senators, the people they represent and the state governors. No easy task, that. (Ferguson, 1987, p49)

The armed forces that are not recruited must be neutralized before the coup and political opposition must be defeated immediately after the coup (Luttwak (1968), 1979, p60).

The defenses of the state must be neutralized before a coup can succeed. The changes in the structure of the military and police forces as the nation has grown, ease this task. Armies and police forces have grown in size to meet the needs of expanding territory and increased populations. The armed forces are less uniform by ethnicity, religion, or class and are therefore easier to infiltrate. Additionally, the advances in technology have increased the firepower and lethality of the individual soldier compared to the civilian. (Luttwak (1968), 1979, p63) Each recruited soldier provides more control and power to the coup planners. There are also problems created by the power of the armed forces.

Resistance to the coup by even a small force of soldiers loyal to the government can defeat the coup. (Luttwak (1968), 1979, p65) The planners must find ways of delaying or neutralizing any response by

these loyal forces. Key positions of leadership and technical skill must be determined. Personnel with access to vital information and equipment are the most important recruits. To decide which soldiers hold these positions, the planners must have an intimate understanding of unit distribution, the command structure, the technical structure and capabilities, and the technical experts required within the units. (Luttwak (1968), 1979, p71). Cleavages other than those between the officers and the troops, such as tribal, ethnic, or religious differences, can be used to the advantage of the planners or at least prevented from causing greater opposition. (Luttwak (1968), 1979, p77) After the key people and divisions are identified, the recruitment process can begin.

Recruiting is potentially the most hazardous stage of the planning process. The state may have an extensive internal security organization that has infiltrated the military. Each individual will have personal motivation for their decision based upon the perceived advantages and future renumerations offered by each possible course of action. To minimize risk during the recruitment process, the recruiting duties should be assigned to a loyal, yet expendable member of the organization. The entire coup will not be jeopardized by the loss of this member.

The planners may have to play upon the desires and fears of each possible recruit in order to attain their support. This may require creative painting of the picture, but the planners must be aware that consistency is vital for credibility. The coup leaders and recruiters should

avoid any direct identification with a specific policy, person, or political group. This approach will give the opposition a less defined target and no issues around which to rally support. (Luttwak (1968), 1979, p85)

Ideally the leader of the coup d'etat or the major planner will be a senior officer in the army. If the planners do not have a member who can fulfill this role, they must recruit one. The ideal recruit for leadership will have attended some form of staff college and have had a major command. It is best if he is on active service and commands obedience and respect from junior and senior officers. With this training and experience, the leader can plan logistics, command and control, intelligence, and operational aspects of the coup. (Ferguson, 1987, p63)

The selected leader of the coup must meet many requirements. Their political views must be sympathetic. They must also believe that intervention is a more viable alternative to the current government. Additonally they must be willing to forsake the civilian powers that have provided high ranking positions. Additionally, a prime candidate would be one who is unsatisfied with current and future advancements and is disappointed in the current leadership's abilities. (Ferguson, 1987, p66) Based on these characteristics, the prime candidate for leader of a coup d'etat in the United States would be a one-star, flag or general officer on active duty. He may have a strong desire for power and be ideologically opposed to the policies of the civilian leadership. Above all, in the United States, the leader must have a strong sense of duty to the country that can override his loyalty to the elected government.

Coup planners should not expend a large amount of effort to recruit the police and paramilitary forces. History has proven that no paramilitary force has ever mobilized in the defense of the target regime. (Luttwak (1968), 1979, p95) The police will likely pursue a wait-and-see policy. The coup planners should neutralize the most dangerous segments of the police force and deal with them more thoroughly after the coup. (Luttwak (1968), 1979, p99)

The security force is a more dangerous adversary. The organization is usually smaller, but its ability and mission threaten the secrecy and anonymity of the coup and the coup planners. The internal security section of the intelligence community is the key adversary within the security organization. Its function is to prevent the overthrow of the government. (Luttwak (1968), 1979, p100) For the United States this function is fulfilled by the FBI. The intelligence organization is, by its function, politically aware. The preferred method of dealing with these forces is to persuade them to join the coup and aid in the seizure of power. (Luttwak (1968), 1979, p104)

Once the coup planners have decided to take power and the recruitment and intelligence gathering is underway, the planning must shift to tactical matters. The execution phase of the coup d'etat is a rapid frenzy of activity that can be compared to a missile strike. All decisions must be made prior to the launch and the planners must then wait for the outcome. (Luttwak (1968), 1979, p146) The entire coup may be over in less than one day, and the actual assaults are likely to last

only two to six hours. Any time beyond this would increase the chance of organized opposition and failure (Ferguson, 1987, p89).

Finding the best way to take control of the machinery of the state will the key to success at this stage. The political forces that may be aligned against the coup must be neutralized. Ceremonial figures, especially those that lend legitimacy, should be handled gently and manipulated as needed to aid the consolidation of control. The inner-circle of key ministers, bureaucrats, and those in control of the forces of coercion should be eliminated or isolated from their organizations. By isolating these key officials, their organizations will be operating without leadership. There may either be no response to the coup or response too slow to make a difference. Lesser officials should be handled after the coup. (Luttwak (1968), 1979, p117) Personalities outside of government who exert considerable influence, such as Ghandi in India, are rare. An example in the United States would likely be a sports hero, music star, or entertainment figure. The Reverend Jesse Jackson may exert this type of unofficial influence. If these personalities exist, they should be handled as ceremonial figures.

Physical facilities that control the flow of information and personnel must be used to the advantage of the coup forces or removed from the control of opposing forces. Mass media will be the most effective means of establishing authority after the coup. Efforts should be concentrated on television and radio stations that have an immediate impact on public opinion and are the faster means of information

distribution. (Luttwak (1968), 1979, p119) Cable News Network (CNN) facilities and broadcast equipment in Atlanta, Georgia would fall under this category. Printed media is slower and reaches a smaller segment of the population. Telecommunications and inter-organizational communications must be controlled for defensive purposes. Control of these facilities will isolate individual members of the opposition and make their response erratic and sluggish. (Luttwak (1968), 1979, p120) The coup will have more chance for success if it is geographically limited in scope because the communications will be easier to cut off or control. (Ferguson, 1987, p87)

Internet communications will be the hardest to control or shut off. During the 1991 attempted coup in the Soviet Union, the electronic links provided by this growing form of communication prevented the perpetrators from isolating Moscow. Gloria Duffy, the president of an institute which researches international peace and security, stated

> It was distressingly easy for them to take hold of the
> broadcasting and print media outlets and squelch the
> information coming through them, but e-mail broke through
> the wall of propaganda immediately. (Perry, 1992, p30)

Others have proclaimed that,

> From Tiananmen Square to the Persian Gulf...electronic
> mail coupled with fax technology is influencing the outcome
> of political events. (Perry, 1992, p30)

Key considerations for would be coup planners is the difficulty in isolating such communication. Geoff Sear of the Institute of Global Communications stated that coup instigators,

...couldn't have stopped it without shutting down their entire phone system, which they needed for their own purposes. (Perry, 1992, p30)

Limiting communications via e-mail will require technical knowledge of this system. This will place an additional burden on would be coup planners.

Mass transit facilities, such as railroads and airports, can be used to move large numbers of opposition forces into positions where they can affect the outcome of the coup. Prevention of use of these facilities is easier than ensuring their use, and can be accomplished by simply blocking a rail or placing a single vehicle on a runway. Control of stations and airports also allow the coup forces to freeze the situation for a period of time and serve as good visual evidence that the coup forces are in control.

Buildings are difficult to assault and to control so efforts need to be concentrated. The seats of power, main administrative nodes, and buildings holding symbolic meaning should be targeted if the forces and time are sufficient. (Luttwak (1968), 1979, pp122-130) "In America, one would naturally seize the Pentagon, the Capitol and the White House." (Ferguson, 1987, p86) Symbolic places or buildings that may have other value to the instigators are more valuable. Communications facilities and nerve-centers of possible opposition forces serve both purposes (Ferguson, 1987, p87).

Political groups must be controlled or neutralized. Extreme and unpopular political groups may be left alone. Their actions opposing the

coup may gain support for the coup from the majority of the population. Religious organizations will require more attention in less developed countries where their influence is greatest. The best policy is to isolate the church from its constituents. Killing church leaders would ignite strong opposition. (Luttwak (1968), 1979, p133) Political parties will be handled differently, depending on each party's structure. Some will simply acquiesce to a fait accompli.(Ferguson, 1987, p50) Insurrectional or machine type parties have the ability to agitate the masses, assassinate coup leaders, sabotage facilities, or practice syndicated agitation opposing the coup. (Luttwak (1968), 1979, p137) Parties of this type in the United States do not have significant influence. If they grow and gain influence, removal of the leadership is usually enough to incapacitate these parties.

The organization that poses the greatest danger to the coup, is the trade union. They possess mass followings and have experience in political action and agitation. The best policy is to avoid directly threatening the trade unions and to avoid violent confrontation if possible (Luttwak (1968), 1979, p143). If the union will potentially oppose the coup, the leadership should be isolated or neutralized since the general union member often is not interested in the political struggles of their leadership. (Ferguson, 1987, p50)

Students are an unpredictable factor. They are portrayed as militant, but seldom act aggressively unless their opportunities or interests are directly threatened. They are easily led, especially if they are

convinced that the new government will act favorably to student ideas. Students are not, however, as coherent or organized as other organizations within society, such as the trade unions. Their leaders may not espouse or know the real feeling or beliefs of their followers. If the response of the student organizations is uncertain, it is best to isolate the leadership. (Ferguson, 1987, p51)

Table 2 shows how critical the pre-coup preparations are in meeting the challenges of state forces:

Phase	Response By Opposition	Effects From Prior Planning
1	Police/Security agency personnel raise initial alarms and seek to contact their headquarters	Telephone exchange has been seized, telex cable links have been sabotaged, radio relays are shut off. They must therefore send a verbal message.
2	Police/security agency HQ verify the reports and realize the seriousness of the threat. HQ tries to communicate with political leadership.	As above for communications. Some messengers fail to arrive as focal traffic points are gradually occupied.
3	Political leadership calls for army and police intervention.	As above for communications. Some units missing from their barracks; others refuse to move;others cannot move because of technical neutralization
4	Political leaders begin to realize the extent of our infiltration of the armed forces and police. Loyalist troops respond.	As above for communications. Only military radio links can be used to communicate with loyalist forces.
5	Uninfiltrated forces assemble and prepare for intervention. They try to reach political leadership for a confirmation of their orders. Some defect to us, others choose neutrality, but some remain under the control of the government.	Many political leaders no longer available; some arrested and some in hiding.
6	Loyalist forces move on to capital city or if already within its area, move in to the city center.	Airports are closed and landing strips interdicted. Railways interrupted and trains stopped. City entry points controlled by our roadblocks.
	Loyalist forces in capital area are then isolated by direct means	

Table 2. The Mechanics of Intervention of the Loyalist Forces
(Luttwak (1968), 1979, p151, Table 14)

Operations should also take advantage of holidays and evening hours. There will be fewer people to sound the alarm and few people prepared to respond. Loss of communications will be less noticeable and overall manning of all targets can be expected to be lower. There is less

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chance of having to resort to force if the opposition is small and unprepared. A small number of casualties or no casualties will reflect favorably on those who have seized power when the population is made aware of events. (Ferguson, 1987, p91)

The final phase of the coup is to stabilize the situation as rapidly as possible. Coup forces must be stabilized to prevent counter-coups and loss of control of individual soldiers. Any looting or excess violence will cost the coup valuable support from the population. (Luttwak (1968), 1979, p163) The bureaucracy is the next group to be stabilized. If the bureaucracy feels insecure, individuals within it may decide to offer resistance either through active opposition or by refusing to allow the bureaucracy to operate. Coup leaders should reassure the bureaucracy that changes will not have a negative effect on their organization or position. Communications should be limited between the nonparticipating portions of the armed forces and the bureaucracy to prevent the growth of opposition or counter-coups. (Luttwak (1968), 1979, p166)

The next task is to stabilize the masses. Coup initiators must gain acceptance. The flow of information and people must be frozen or manipulated for the benefit of the coup forces. All communication via the mass media should show control of the situation rather than concentrating on giving justification for the coup. News of opposition must be suppressed to lower the risk of bandwagoning to the resistance. The political message sent out to the population must be designed to

gain the support of allies. An intimate understanding of the political situation will allow the coup leaders to tailor their message to gain short or long term allies. Which allies are more important to the success of the coup is decided by the perceived weaknesses within the coup organization. (Luttwak (1968), 1979, pp167-171)

The final step for a successful coup is to gain legitimacy. The coup must overcome the illegal nature of its seizure of power. Heads of state serve an important function if they can provide this legitimacy. Recognition by foreign powers is important because it can confer legitimacy. A negative aspect of foreign recognition is the possible effect of making the population believe that the forces behind the coup d'etat are controlled by foreign powers. (Luttwak (1968), 1979, 172) Legitimacy is also gained by demonstrating the ability to run and lead the nation. The new leadership will have to turn the running of the government back over to the bureaucracies and civilian administrators. They must also correct the problems that they proclaimed were the motivation for the coup d'etat in order to prevent themselves from being removed from power. (Ferguson, 1987, p193) The distribution of political power and the pervasiveness of information make it impossible for the initiators of a coup d'etat to gain legitimacy after the fact. It is more likely that the military has already gained acceptance and popularity prior to any decision to intervene.

The minimal goal that is acceptable is a restoration of stability. This goal is made difficult by the problem of precedence.

A major problem facing any country which has suffered a coup d'etat is that of precedence; it has happened once, it can happen again. A coup weakens the political institutions to a greater degree than any internecine strife in the civilian sector may have done before; it makes military rule a more or less acceptable norm...The politization of the military presents an enormous problem in the aftermath of a coup. Once an intelligent officer sees for himself how the country is run...he is in a position to make value judgments on the performance of the civilian government...The unique master-servant relationship between government and military has been destroyed...(Ferguson, 1987, p194)

Military officers in the United States should understand the dire consequences of a coup d'etat and make all efforts to prevent the creation of conditions that could encourage intervention. They should also have a general understanding of the mechanics of a coup to respond effectively if they are ever called to oppose an attempt.

V. SCENARIO

A.   INTRODUCTION

The following story is about an attempted coup d'etat which occurs in the United States at an undefined time in the future. It will draw on aspects of the Dunlap article and the movie, *Seven Days in May* (Paramount, 1964) This scenario is meant to be explicitly an academic exercise with two goals. The first goal is to bring together the theories on coups d'etat and civil-military relations and place them in a familiar setting. The second goal arises from the successful accomplishment of the first goal. It is to create a viable if not necessarily believable scenario of a coup d'etat in the United States to serve as a polemic. Hopefully, the coup d'etat, as a phenomenon, will seem less relegated to small nations or inexperienced governments in far off, third-world countries and, therefore, become a more immediate problem.

This thesis and scenario does not argue that a coup d'etat in the United States will occur in the future or that it is probable. It does, however, argue the possibility of this event in any nation which has a professional military. Any reaction by military leaders or academic experts towards the scenario, negative or positive, is success for this effort because it will engender greater study and discussion.

B.   CASSANDRA'S CURSE

1.   Setup

On Superbowl Sunday the United States ceased to exist. As the years rolled by, those who wished to assess responsibility blamed two men. Most would blame General Michael Alexander Drake, U.S. Army, but a few, especially scholars, blamed Thomas Jefferson. Lieutenant (LT) Casey Richardson knew better because he prevented the first attempted coup d'etat. Though he was able to stop this coup, the example had been set, and others would follow. His story is presented below to help others decide who caused the end of the United States.

2.   Story

He really wants to watch the game, even more than the previous year, because his favorite team was back in the big game. His San Francisco Forty-Niners would be playing the Nashville Oilers despite some unpopular realignments of the American Football Conference (AFC) and the National Football Conference (NFC). Today, however, is a duty day and he had a tough day ahead of him. He is assigned as the Deputy Commander of the Joint Law Enforcement Assistance Detachment (JLEAD) in Washington, D.C. with a force of 200 enlisted service members. His Commanding Officer is Major Larry Waybill. The Major is a graduate from the Military Academy at West Point, so they have had a few good-natured arguments about their alma maters. Both the Naval Academy and West Point had little to brag about during football season. It seems that nothing changes, at least in football.

A junior officer has to try hard to avoid running into graduates from the academies these days. It seems to LT Richardson that they were the only schools which commissioned officers anymore. Though it is comfortable to serve with people with similar backgrounds and educations, he remembers one of his professors back at the Naval Postgraduate School had mentioned his displeasure about the lack of officers from schools other than the military academies in Colorado Springs, West Point, and Annapolis. The reason now sits as a gray cloud in the back of his mind, but he brushes it aside and went to work.

The first meeting for the day would be with the Section Duty Officer of the Washington, D.C. police department. Jim Talmadge, the police captain in charge of this duty section, would be late as usual, but Casey planned to be on time. There was nowhere else where leadership by example was needed more and he could read the paper while he waited.

Soon, he wouldn't have to wait for public officials or union workers to show up when they pleased or perform poorly without fear of reprisal. General Drake, the current Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), had authorized an extensive advertising effort by the armed forces in support of the legislation known as the Military Assistance Domestic Autonomy (MADA) Law. The law would give military commanders assigned to law enforcement, disaster relief, urban renewal, and medical aid programs the authority to fire and hire all civilian employees of the city or state organization that was receiving help. Expediency and efficiency was expected to improve dramatically within

the first year. The General's public relations efforts had been designed to head off expected opposition from the unions. The unions decided to offer only token resistance and symbolic public announcements. They knew the public support for the MADA Law would be strong and the unions had other issues to handle. Casey could see that Jim was not happy about this outcome.

"Mornin, Lieutenant."

"Mornin, Mr. Talmadge, how are Michelle and the kids?"

"Oh, Michelle and Jim Jr, are fine but little Mike has a cold. I guess children just have to keep you busy or they aren't doing their job, huh?"

"I suppose, but I don't want to say too much since Jessie and I don't have any of our own."

"Well, Lieutenant, I read the paper this morning. I guess you guys got that law passed. Can't say I like it very much. I understand that the military has to run a lot of things nowadays, but I didn't put in 19 years to be ordered around by some snot-nosed J.O. (Junior Officer). I have nothing against you personally, you've been professional and I see you as a friend. I know Michelle enjoys having you over for dinner. Its just that they aren't all like you. Some of your buddies can be real pains in the ole hiney," he says with an insincere look of pain on his face.

"Look Jim. We didn't do it to boss anyone around. We had to. The reason we picked up all these jobs was because the people who should

have been doing them were wasting time and money. We want to solve these problems and get back to our own business."

"And leave these 'shore' jobs and go back to sea or jump around in the dirt?" he asks with some genuine disbelief.

"Yea, Jim, believe it or not, we joined the military to do just that! Well, maybe not the worst of the stuff about deployments, but to get out there and defend this country. Anyway, I know the new law will get us out of your backyard sooner than later."

"I hope you're right Casey," Jim says, shaking his head slowly. "Anyway, here's the news from last night. There were three muggings, one on M-Street in the southeast section, and two on 14th Street. Not much new there. All the witnesses gave different accounts. I passed their statements on to your intelligence guys already. There was a shooting on the Beltway near the Rockcreek Parkway exit. No clues yet on that one. And, finally, the two radio vans showed up on the mall last night. The patrol officers didn't know anything about it, but they called your office and Major Waybill authorized them to be parked there for the exercise. Anyway, it was a relatively quiet night except for the muggings. Anything for me?"

"No, that should cover it. I saw the paperwork on the muggings. When will people learn not to walk around outside the protected areas? I suppose it's time to have my people put together another public service announcement." Casey hides his doubts well and tries to ask the next question in a casual manner. He doesn't want Jim to think that there

was any break in the information flow in this command. "These trucks you mentioned, why did they need permission from the Major to park near the mall?"

"It's no big deal really, it's just that the Parks and Recreation people normally like keeping the streets near the capital open so that tourists can get around. Why?"

"Oh, I forgot they were going to park there, must have slipped my mind," he shrugs. "Anything else Jim?"

"Nothing right now."

"O.K., I'll be checking out some of our community relations posts today, so if you want to reach me, use e-mail. I'll have my cellular modem turned on. If not, I'll see you at this evening's debrief."

"See you then Casey," Jim says as he gathers his papers and stands up.

"Sure, and thanks Jim." Casey stands and adds, "Don't worry about the new law. I'm sure it will help more than it will hurt."

"I'll try not to Casey. Later."

Casey steps out of the detachment headquarters into another frigid winter day. His breath creates great big clouds in the air. He had never outgrown a childhood fascination with watching the clouds form, take on their own distinct shape and then vanish into the air. He adjusts the collar on his overcoat and heads to his car. There are twelve joint force security stations he wants to visit before the end of the day and now he can add the new goal of visiting the communications vans, which are

really just green trucks with radio gear in the back.

He couldn't recall the Major mentioning the need for extra communications during the exercise. Still, it wasn't like Larry to forget something like that. Ever since Larry had taken command of the detachment under those strange circumstances he had proven himself to be a outstanding officer. He was charismatic and intelligent and it was impossible to deny his love of country or sense of duty. As with all good officers, he made sure that information flowed up and down the chain-of-command. That's what made it weird. Casey thinks to himself, "Maybe the extra responsibility of running the exercise made him forget to tell me."

Casey drives into the immaculate parking lot of Post Number 3. That is one reason public support for the Joint Forces is so strong. They can look outside and see the graffiti and trash in their communities and compare it to the clean and groomed areas under military control. There are no drug addicts or gangs in the armed forces and the enlisted personnel have more drive and training than the average civilian. Many civilian families have children who are out of control and lack any kind of respect for authority.

"Still," he thinks, "it hasn't prevented the Congress from reducing retirement benefits and health care for military dependents. The mighty dollar is always right." He hadn't contributed to the multi-trillion dollar deficit in the late nineties which caused the budget reduction legislation. Unfortunately, in order to get the law passed, concessions had to be

made to the senior citizens by protecting social security and medicare benefits. Therefore, the target for cuts became the military budget. Now over 40 percent of the already limited budget was devoted to OOTW and domestic programs. His guys had been complaining about how their own families had to take advantage of the aid programs run by the military. They asked him several times why the government couldn't just pay the soldiers and sailors more. They were serving their nation and providing services, yet to feed their kids, they couldn't save for the future. Sergeant Sean Petrie is one of these servicemen.

"Good Morning, Sergeant, how are things this morning?"

"Things are good this morning and you look real cold L.T." the sergeant exclaimed. He likes Casey as much as guy can really like an officer and enjoys duty days with him. Things are usually calm and controlled. "L.T., there's nothing going on this morning. We have some buddies who are willing to call us whenever there is a score in the game. I think your Forty-Niners are in for good fight."

"I think they'll do fine, Sergeant Petrie. Its not like when your Georgia Bulldogs meet Tennessee in the SEC (Southeastern Conference), the Niners actually have a chance of winning," he jokes, knowing that he is pushing a button.

"Oh L.T., why did you have to say something like that. I actually thought you were cool," the sergeant shoots back, laughing. "By the way, why are we going to have live tear gas canisters for the exercise? Last time we did that, it cost us over $500 because we accidentally set some

canisters off. It is cool, though, how you and the Major got us those Tasers. We've wanted those for our patrols for forever." The sergeant understands how the high voltage stun guns would allow someone to take down a criminal without getting close. Though less important to those on actual patrol but very important to lawyers, the criminal could also be taken down without using too much force.

Again, Casey is jarred. He is not used to finding out information from second hand sources and is getting upset. He keeps his demeanor calm and tries to get a bit more data. "Sarge, when did the Tasers come in anyway? I though it would take longer."

"I think it was yesterday. The guys from the special communications team brought them up from Fort Myer."

"Thanks. Have you heard from the Major today?"

"No L.T. I sure haven't. I bet he's getting ready for the exercise."

"Yea, you are probably right."

Casey read the daily log in silence. Something is a bit strange about this morning's exercise. It was designed to see how the standby security team would respond to demonstrators trying to impede the President on his morning jog. "Why would they need tear gas or Tasers?" he asks himself. "More importantly, why was this info not passed to me?" Casey decides that it is probably to test him to see how the duty officer would react. If so, it was a good idea, but it was poorly implemented. He should not have known about the whole exercise, if the Major had wanted it to be a surprise.

The pensive Lieutenant finishes his work, briefs the Sergeant and his two assistants, and steps back outside. He sighs a big breath cloud and watches it disappear. He decides at this point to make his next stop the communications trucks.

The communications vans are parked back-to-back to ease access from one to the other. Each is designed to provide a centralized communications headquarters for battalion commanders. The exercise is for a platoon sized team. Casey realizes there is something strange going on, but he can't make his thoughts coherent. There is a conclusion which seems to float around the corners of his mind, never distinct yet unavoidable. With a deep breath to gather himself, he strides toward the trucks. "O.K. Casey, play it cool and get some facts," he instructs himself. Three raps on the right-hand truck are greeted by an open door and a face. The face belonged to a young man of about 20 years of age who was eager to close the door against the cold.

"Yes, sir?" he inquires of the Lieutenant while rubbing his ungloved hands together.

"I came by to see how everything was going. Lets take a look inside."

The soldier glances quickly behind him into the trailer and reluctantly lets the Lieutenant inside. "Sure, sir, come on in," he responds to avoid any hassle.

Casey looks around and sees that everything is running properly, but there are no visual cues to help him understand what was happening

with the Major. It would require some conversations. "Corporal Jenkins," Casey reads off the soldier's name tag, "are you ready for this afternoon? It is going to be a big one."

The corporal hesitates for a moment and then responds, "I think everything will go fine. It's about time someone actually took charge and fixed this country."

Casey is stunned. The question had been designed to see if the exercise was going to test him as well as the response team. The answer almost refuses to register in his mind, but he forces it into focus. He really has to play it cool now. "Are you and the others all clear on the plans?"

"Yes sir, the Major briefed us really well. Why, did you miss the brief sir? We made some minor changes," the corporal asks as a twinge of doubt enters his mind about the Lieutenant's involvement in the plans.

Casey knows his answer must be believable and calm to avoid letting the Sergeant know that he is not really part of the plan. "I had to make sure the Tasers arrived on time. Major Waybill and I talked about the changes before the meeting." He sees the doubt fade from the face of the conspirator even as apprehension grows in his own mind. "I need an excuse to stay out of the cold for a little while," he adds as he sits down in one of the console seats and removes his gloves. "Let's go over the plans one more time." Casey stretches and runs his hands though his hair while waiting for response.

"Man, you are just like the Major. He loves repetition and practice, practice, practice. Here's the whole shebang one more time. It's not like I didn't have this memorized after the tenth time," he adds with a feigned look of frustration. He makes a small effort to cover the pride he feels because of his mastery of the plan. "The Air Force recruiting commercial during the pre-game show will be the signal for our team to secure the President with minimal force. Once we have the President under our control, we will signal, from here, the rest of our teams in the Pentagon, Fort Myer, Andrews (Air Force Base), Langley, Fort Meade, Fort Belvoir, and Bolling Air Force Base. These teams will shut down the Beltway and cut all land communications lines using prepositioned guys. They will also pass on the 'go' signal to the rest of our troops throughout the nation. Two minutes after halftime, if everything is going well, the General will make an announcement to CNN and to all TV viewers, stating our actions and intentions," he recited. "So, did I cover the big points, LT?" asks Jenkins, knowing that he had.

Casey makes a mental note of all Jenkins had just told him. He realizes that he has been dropped into the middle of a plot. He is involved in the initiating event for a military takeover of the United States and the kidnapping of the President. He has always been calm under pressure, but his composure is facing its greatest challenge. He knows that there is only one thing to do and that there is only a few hours for him to do it. "Corporal Jenkins, it looks like you have your part under control. It will be good to know that you will be on our side,"

Casey lies. The newly focused and determined Lieutenant replaces his winter clothes and steps back into the frigid morning.

The obfuscated thoughts now emerge into the bright light of realization. He sits with the car engine running, gathering himself for the upcoming task. He knows he doesn't have the time to find out who he can trust or how far the conspiracy spreads. It is obvious that there are at least supporters of this plot in all the key areas around the Capital. He also knows that Major Waybill eventually will realize that Casey knows what is going on. The corporal would let it slip. He drives toward the parking lot to the northwest of the Washington Monument, where the Major would be coordinating the exercise with the response team. Now the reasons behind the Major's recent inflexibility on transfers into the response team become clear. This team must be his selected people. This would make things difficult and dangerous.

As Casey drives up to the briefing trailer to confront the man who he had believed to be a friend, the team turns to identify the approaching car. The Major steps out of the trailer to great him. "Casey! What brings you here?" he asks as he puts on his field jacket.

"He still called me by name and doesn't seem upset, so he must not know yet," thought the Lieutenant. He can't bring himself to continue calling him Larry though. "Major Waybill, top of the morning to you," Casey answers in as cheerful a tone as he can muster. There is no need to let the Major know anything until he can get move away from the

response team. "I have some news for you if you have a moment. It is kind of private though."

The Major barely pauses. "Sure Casey, let's take a walk towards the Vietnam Memorial. I have some time." He puts his hands across Casey's shoulders. "You look cold and worried. Is it bad news?"

"Yes, it is. The worst I've ever heard. I just couldn't talk about it in front of the men."

"It's all right. What's the news?"

Casey waits until they are out of sight from the trailer. "Major Waybill, Larry, I know what's going on with the President and I don't understand." The Major has a sidearm like Casey, but neither chooses to draw them despite the instant fear, anger, and doubt the other feels in the presence of the other man. "Please don't do this," Casey asks hopefully.

"Casey, I didn't want you to know because I knew you wouldn't understand. I can't let you stop us though," the Major states as he moves his hand unconsciously toward his pistol.

"Try to make me understand, Major." Casey purposely uses rank to address his commanding officer to remind him subtly of his duty. "Make me understand," he demands.

"Casey, I don't have time and you are getting in my way. I don't want to have to shoot a fellow officer, but I will," the Major warns with barely restrained aggression.

"Well you are going to have to, MAJOR." Casey draws his sidearm, which, unlike the Major's, was already loose in its holster. "Unless you want to either explain why two officers killed each other on the mall or have the news people reporting our attempts to kill each other, you had better start talking to me. It can't be good to have the leader of the point team involved in this type of situation this close to when your conspiracy is supposed to start."

"Look, Lieutenant, don't you see where this country is headed?" the Major implores. He knows he cannot afford to be in a shooting or a struggle. There are too many people around, even for a Superbowl Sunday. Already tourists and workers are whispering and walking away rapidly. "The government has shut down for over three times for over four weeks each time because of budget issues for the past four years. The budget they actually pass is useless. We, me and you, the military, have to run almost all the programs for the poor or elderly and yet our men haven't gotten a raise in eight years. Not only that, they took away all our medical benefits. You can't tell me that its been easy having to send our guys to managed health care."

"So you're saying that you want to give up democracy because of money?" Casey asks with disgust.

"No! That's just an indication that the politicians and the bureaucracy are ineffective. Its a symptom of a disease. The only place where it is safe to walk at night is where the Joint Forces have control. Race riots were spreading like wildfire until we were called in to help

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enforce peace. We even have to control illegal immigration. I don't know about you Casey, but I can't stand to see our guys killed fighting illegal immigrant smugglers. The numbers tell the story better than anything else. Nobody votes anymore and those who do can't make any difference anyway. The civilian leaders have gotten rich and out of touch. They think the solution to all our problems to have the military do the job. So why pay the civilians who are supposed to be doing these jobs? If they want us in charge, then we will take charge."

"You think by taking over the government, you can make it all better?" Casey asks, not hiding his skepticism. "You will probably destroy the only thing that can actually make an improvement, popular representation. You should know the history of authoritarian countries in the west. They don't work. The people, our people, our families would never allow or condone it."

"I think they would Casey. We provide security and stability in what has become a mess of a society. We are the only ones who can keep this country running and together. When we got torn up trying to defend Saudi Arabia because the President and Congress wouldn't send in troops, the public screamed for more defense money. They saw who was at fault."

"You and whoever you are working for are arrogant and stupid," Casey shot back. "Not everyone feels that the country has lost the ability to excel or that it is falling apart. Even if it is, we cannot have a government where the guy who controls the most guns makes the rules.

We might as well have warlords or something. You think the next guy will like the policies that you will come up with? There will always be someone who's unhappy and wants to take over. Do you want your kids to go through life in that kind of chaos?"

"Casey, I've thought through this and made up my mind months ago. I don't see any other way to do it. The general population is too wrapped up in their own near sighted problems and don't understand the dangers that face this country. As uninformed and inept as they are, we still have to protect them. Besides, General Drake has promised to return power to the elected government after we've taken care of protecting our oil supply and giving back these non-military missions."

Casey waved his gun to direct the Major toward his car. "You are gravely deluded. Major Waybill, I am arresting you for sedition and treason. I need you to ...," Casey never finishes the sentence.

Major Waybill spins around and lunges for the gun. Casey shoots twice, hitting the Major in the left thigh and upper arm. Casey drags him into the open and runs back to his car. Without stopping to see if the response team had spotted him, he speeds off toward the communications vans. The Major is unconscious and losing blood, but Casey has a more pressing problem. There are already bystanders helping the Major anyway. He works himself out of his blood stained overcoat during the drive and slows as he approaches the trucks. He doesn't want to draw too much attention to his arrival. He hides the gun in his belt and knocks on the door. The clouds of his breath come in rapidly forming

plumes. The door opens and he pushes his way inside. He takes aim and punches the watchstander in the chin, sending him flying into the second watchstander. Casey takes out his gun and, using it as a club finishes knocking them out. He pulls out all the fuses he can find and pours a thermos of coffee he finds over the computers. He then smashes everything he can with the thermos and conceals his gun again. He was lucky that he didn't have to fire it. A very real effort is needed to slow his breathing. There is one more truck to take care of.

The knock brings a reassuringly familiar response. As the door opens Casey collects himself and propels himself and the unprepared soldier into the back of the truck. This time he is not as lucky. The second watchstander is seated too far away for Casey to reach him.

"NO!" Casey screams as the young sailor reaches for the radio handset. Unfortunately he doesn't stop. Casey retrieves his pistol, swings it up, and fires. The soldier he had knocked over begins to struggle until Casey sits back and points the pistol toward him, shaking his head. The soldier understands and doesn't move. Casey looks up at the sailor, slumped in his chair. It would take all three of them a long time to get over the fright of last few seconds. The sailor is terrified by the thought that he could have been shot. The bullet hole in the roof of the truck lets in a beam of sunlight which illuminates the American Flag on the soldier's jacket.

As the pre-game show winds down, the President, who has finished his shower, is preparing to watch the football game. He wants to practice

what he is planning to say to the winning team when he calls them after the game. A harried looking man bursts into the room.

"Mr. President," the National Security Advisor says to get the President's attention. "I just received a report that there was an attempted coup d'etat. General Drake is under arrest and we are trying to determine the extent of the plot. I think you will be safe here. The secret service and the FBI have secured the area. I don't know all the information yet, but my people are on it."

The President is dumbfounded. He never considered the U.S. military capable of committing such an act. Though he had not served in the military or been close to anyone who had, he thought he understood the military mind. They seemed happy and had plenty to keep them busy. He wonders why they had chosen this path. "How did we find out about this plot and how close was it to succeeding?" he asks as the agitation builds in his voice.

"Sir, I have only been briefed on the reports of one witness. He says it was a widespread plot, but I don't believe him sir. I would not believe that more than just a handful of people in the armed forces would participate. It's just not what history proves about the U.S. military."

VI. CONCLUSION

The United States has become the model for civil-military relations by default as other nations falter in maintaining civilian control over their armed forces. We continue to offer our system as a model throughout the world through programs like the International Military Education and Training (IMET) Program and at institutions such as the Naval Postgraduate School. Though it is true that the United States has enjoyed military success and continued civilian control of the armed forces, some, like Weigley, argue that this has been due more to luck than to systemic excellence. A historical review of U.S. civil-military relations shows that the present military requirements do not conform with the aspirations of the American public. A nation traditionally wary of large or standing militaries was forced into a world leadership role after the Second World War and acquired extensive military needs. The original system of civil-military relations is strained by the new conditions. There are many who argue that there is a crisis in civil-military relations.

This thesis argues that there is not a crisis in U.S. civil-military relations if a crisis is defined as direct military challenge to civilian authority. Problems that exist result from the changing world environment that forced the United States into its present role as a superpower. This role was not envisioned or planned for by the founders of the United States so the present system of civil-military relations no longer meets the needs of the nation. A professional military drawn into

political activism by the security needs of the nation and its own corporate interests has become separated from the political, civilian leadership. The soldier-statesman and citizen-soldier does not exist in the form as it was 200 years ago and there will be continuing conflict between the military and the civilians over national policy and security issues as perceptions and goals diverge. With proper study and attention, these changes can be adjusted for in our civil-military relations without the loss of civilian control.

The tension between the armed forces and the civilian government will almost certainly not result in a coup d'etat in the United States. Political participation and public discourse are viable and preferable options for those who chose to change the existing system. Most military officers also have strong ties to society via family and friends, thus alleviating some of the isolation and distinctiveness that could separate the military from society. The coup would be the most direct and distinct form of challenge to civilian supremacy. It would be unwise, therefore, to ignore the possibility because of the devastating results such an occurrence would have on our system of government.

There are two issues that should be more carefully researched since they would be the most likely causes of a coup d'etat in the United States. The first issue is to determine factors that would cause the U.S. military to become further isolated from mainstream society in thought but more powerful in political and domestic influence. The second issue is to understand the conditions that could create a sense of danger

within the U.S. military.

Further understanding of these two issues will allow the educated and effective creation of a new system of civil-military relations. A more effective system will make the possibility of a coup d'etat, or any other form of military intervention, even less probable. Finally, a revised system of civil-military relations can lessen the conflicts between civilian and military leadership and thus increase effectiveness of defense and national security planning.

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